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DISCLOSURE AND DISQUALIFICATION
STANDARDS FOR NEUTRAL
ARBITRATORS: HOW FAR TO CAST THE
NET AND WHAT IS SUFFICIENT TO
VACATE AWARD
MERRICK T. RoSSEINt & JENNIFER HOPEtt

INTRODUCTION

Since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,1 increasingly more employers
require as a term of employment that the prospective or current
employee agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim, or controversy
arising between the employer and employee. 2 Thus, claims of
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, 3 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,4 the
6
Americans with Disabilities Act, 5 the Family Medical Leave Act,

t Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. The author
serves as an arbitrator and mediator on the Employment, Commercial, and
International panels of the American Arbitration Association. He is the inaugural
Scholar-in-Residence of the ABA Section on Labor and Employment, ADR
Committee. All rights reserved © 2006.
tt J.D. Candidate, May 2007, City University of New York School of Law; B.A.,
1999, Rutgers University.
1 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
2 See Walter J. Gershenfeld, The Changing Face of Employment/Workplace
Dispute Resolution, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 135, 143 (2004) (noting the impact of
employment arbitration on unfair-dismissal legislation and calling for increased
fairness in proceedings); Christopher B. Kaczmarek, Public Law Deserves Public
Justice: Why Public Law Arbitrators Should Be Required to Issue Written,
Publishable Opinions, 4 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POLY J. 285, 293-94 (2000) ("Employers,
faced with a rising number of employment discrimination claims and a
corresponding fear of having to pay large jury verdicts to former employees, have
responded to the Supreme Court's strong endorsement of arbitration by increasingly
making arbitration of employment-related claims a condition of employment.").
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
4 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000).
5 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000).
6 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000).
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and disputes concerning other federal, state, and local
employment statutes and common law are increasingly decided
by arbitrators.
Further, written employment agreements
frequently contain arbitration provisions. The selection of the
arbitrator is an essential component in the process of creating a
fair and impartial forum for the resolution of workplace disputes.
In the selection of the arbitrator and throughout the arbitral
process, neutral arbitrators are required to make disclosures of
information that might raise an appearance of, or an actual
7
conflict of, interest.
Disclosures should be made before the appointment of an
arbitrator, and arbitrators generally remain under a continuing
obligation to make any disclosures concerning possible conflicts
of interest that come to the arbitrator's attention after his or her
appointment. Rules and ethics standards vary concerning the
extent of such disclosures.
For example, the American
Arbitration Association's Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in
Commercial Disputes requires any person requested to serve as
an arbitrator to disclose any direct or indirect financial or
personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration, and existing
or past financial, business, professional, or personal relationships

7 See, e.g., CAL. R. CT., ETHICS STANDARDS FOR NEUTRAL ARBITRATORS IN
CONTRACTUAL ARBITRATION No. 7(d) [hereinafter CAL. ETHICS STDS.] (describing
various situations that require disclosure by a prospective arbitrator, such as a
family relationship by the prospective arbitrator with one of the parties to the
dispute-note that the California ethics standards are statutory in nature); AM. BAR
ASS'N, THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES Canon II
(2004), http://www.abanet.org/dispute/commercialdisputes.pdf [hereinafter AAA/
ABA CODE OF ETHICS] (addressing the requirement that before accepting a position
as an arbitrator, an individual should divulge any information that may pose a
conflict of interest). The AAA International Arbitration Rules state:
Arbitrators acting under these rules shall be impartial and independent.
Prior to accepting appointment, a prospective arbitrator shall disclose to
the administrator any circumstance likely to give rise to justifiable doubts
as to the arbitrator's impartiality or independence ....
Upon receipt of such
information from an arbitrator or party, the administrator shall
communicate it to the other parties and to the tribunal.
AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES art. 7,
1 (2006),
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28144.
Arbitrators are required to file a "Notice of Appointment" form disclosing any
past or present relationship of any kind, direct or indirect, with the parties or their
counsel. The case manager, in writing, will call the facts to the attention of each
party. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, DISCLOSURE AND CHALLENGE OF AN
ARBITRATOR, http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=2521
[hereinafter, AAA ARBITRATOR
DISCLOSURE].

2007]

DISCLOSURE & DISQUALIFICATION STANDARDS

205

with any of the parties, prospective witnesses, lawyers, or other
arbitrators; they must also disclose any such relationships
involving their families or household members.8 The California
Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual
Arbitration ("California Standards") are probably the most
expansive and far reaching.9 If an arbitrator fails to make a
required disclosure, the California Standards provide for
mandatory and automatic disqualification of the arbitrator once
a party serves a timely notice of disqualification. 10 Disclosure
requirements are expressly mandated by statute.1" In contrast,
other ethics rules allow for discretion in determining whether a
12
prospective arbitrator should be removed.
Despite these ethics standards, the determination of vacatur
depends on whether an arbitrator's nondisclosure or allegedly
deficient disclosure satisfies the statutory scheme under which
8 AAAJABA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 7, Canon II. See also NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS MANUAL, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE
R. 10312(a) (2006) [hereinafter NASD MANUAL] which requires its arbitrators to

disclose:
(1) Any direct or indirect financial or personal interest in the outcome of
the arbitration;
(2) Any existing or past financial, business, professional, family, social, or
other relationships or circumstances that are likely to affect impartiality or
might reasonably create an appearance of partiality or bias. Persons
requested to serve as arbitrators must disclose any such relationships or
circumstances that they have with any party or its counsel, or with any
individual whom they have been told will be a witness. They must also
disclose any such relationship or circumstances involving members of their
families or their current employers, partners, or business associates.
Id.
9 CAL. ETHICS STDS., supra note 7, No. 7(d)(1)-(14); see also CAL. CIV. PRO.
CODE § 1281.9 (West 2006).
10 CAL. ETHICS STDS., supra note 7, No. 10(a)(1); see also CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE
§ 1286.2(a)(6) (West 2006) (noting that if the arbitrator fails to remove himself from
the panel, the arbitration award may be vacated); Azteca Constr., Inc. v. ADR
Consulting, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 146 (Ct. App. 2004) (referring to the ability of
a party to exercise their right to remove a prospective arbitrator, the court noted
that "[t]here is no good faith or good cause requirement for the exercise of this right,
nor is there a limit on the number of proposed neutrals who may be disqualified in
this manner").
11 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.9(a)(2) (West 2006).
12 See, e.g., NASD MANUAL, supra note 8, R. 10308(d)(1) (noting that when a
party objects to an arbitrator's appointment, the NASD Director of Arbitration "shall
determine if the arbitrator should be disqualified"). Likewise, the disclosure rule in
the NASD Code also specifies that "[t]he Director may remove an arbitrator based on
information that is required to be disclosed pursuant to this Rule." Id. R.10312(d)(1)
(emphasis added).
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an arbitration award is being challenged, which in the United
13
States is most likely the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").
This paper examines the disclosure rules and the
interpretation of these rules by federal courts and proposes a less
onerous standard. The majority of the courts and codes adopt a
reasonableness standard to determine whether evident partiality
exists that requires disqualification of the arbitrator.
One
important issue examined is whether the courts uniformly apply
the reasonableness standard. Another issue of great concern to
the parties engaged in arbitrations and the arbitrators is
whether the code requirements are realistic or too onerous and
difficult to meet, leading to increased arbitration expenses and

delay. 14
Part I reviews the U.S. Supreme Court's plurality opinion
laying a shaky foundation for a disclosure and disqualification
standard. Part II places the issue in the context of courts giving
great deference to the decisions of arbitrators and the general
presumption in favor of upholding arbitration awards where
challenged. Part III examines the FAA and federal decisional
law interpretation of the "evident partiality" standard first
articulated by the Supreme Court in disclosure cases. Part IV
reviews how the courts address the arbitrator's lack of knowledge
of an undisclosed conflict. Part V reviews the recent changes
in disclosure requirements, including the AAA/ABA Code of
Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, the California
Standards, the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act's treatment of
evident partiality, and the National Association of Securities
Dealers ("NASD") rules. Part VI critically assesses the various
standards and proposes a standard intended to ensure that the
arbitral process remains expeditious and efficient in the context
of employment arbitration.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT'S EVIDENT PARTIALITY STANDARD:
"APPEARANCE OF BIAS" OR "REASONABLENESS"

In Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty
Co.,15 the U.S. Supreme Court in a plurality decision held that an
9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
The author plans to conduct an empirical study to determine whether the
code's disclosure requirements lead to increase costs. Here, the question is raised
without a definitive statistical answer.
15 393 U.S. 145 (1968) (plurality opinion).
13

14
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arbitrator's failure to disclose a material relationship with one of
the parties constituted "evident partiality" under 9 U.S.C.
§ 10(a)(2), requiring vacatur of the award.16 Along with its
primary concerns about the appearance of bias that might result
from such nondisclosure, 17 Justice White, in his concurring
opinion, noted that the arbitration process would be best served
by requiring early disclosure of any significant dealings between
arbitrators and parties.1 8 Further, he stated that "[t]he judiciary
should minimize its role in arbitration as judge of the arbitrator's
impartiality," and a policy of early disclosure would limit the
opportunities for "a suspicious or disgruntled party [to] seize on
[an undisclosed relationship] as a pretext for invalidating the
award."' 9 Justice White also observed that some "undisclosed
relationships ...

are too insubstantial to warrant vacating an

award."20

He explained, "an arbitrator's business relationships
may be diverse indeed, involving more or less remote commercial
connections with great numbers of people. He cannot be expected
to provide the parties with his complete and unexpurgated
2
business biography." '
Addressing section 10(a)(2) of the FAA, the Commonwealth
Coatings plurality interpreted "evident partiality" as meaning
that an arbitrator "must be unbiased [and] also must avoid even
the appearance of bias." 22 In Commonwealth Coatings, a neutral
arbitrator failed to disclose that the respondent, a prime
contractor, was a "regular customer]" of the arbitrator's
engineering consulting business. 23 Despite not having patronized
him for a year, their relationship included projects involved in
the arbitration proceeding at issue and had, over four or five
years, involved fees of up to $12,000.24 Following a judgment in
the prime contractor's favor, the petitioner learned of the
undisclosed relationship and subsequently appealed the
arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator's failure to

16 Id. at 147.
17 Id. at 147-48.
18 Id. at 151 (White, J., concurring).
19 Id.

20 Id. at 152.
21 Id. at 151.
22 Id. at 146-50 (plurality opinion).
23 Id.
at 146.
24 Id.
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disclose the relationship (as opposed to arbitrator bias)
2
constituted evident partiality.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's denial of
vacatur, finding that the undisclosed relationship created an
27
impression of bias. 26 Justice Black, writing for the plurality,
analogized arbitrators to judges, stating that arbitrators must
similarly avoid actions that "'reasonably tend to awaken the
suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships
constitute an element in influencing his judicial conduct.' "28
Citing to Rule 18 of the American Arbitration Association's Rules
and the 33rd Canon of Judicial Ethics (noting them as guiding
but not controlling), he opined that "any tribunal permitted by
law to try cases and controversies not only must be unbiased but
also must avoid even the appearance of bias. ' 29 While facts did
not necessarily indicate improper motives, "a decision should be
set aside where there is 'the slightest pecuniary interest' on the
30
part of the judge."
In his concurrence, Justice White wrote that arbitrators
should not be held to the "standards of judicial decorum of Article
III judges," because they are "men of affairs, not apart from but
of the marketplace." 3 1 While he agreed that in this instance the
arbitrator showed evident partiality, he rejected any automatic
25

Id.

Id. at 149-50.
There is some question as to whether Justice Black wrote for a majority or
only a plurality. Justice White, with Justice Marshall, concurred in the opinion and
noted: "While I am glad to join my Brother Black's opinion in this case, I desire to
make these additional remarks." Id. at 150 (White, J., concurring). Some courts have
argued that this "joining" makes Black's opinion a majority and therefore binding
authority, while others have held that White's mention of his "additional remarks"
clearly indicates a divergent opinion. Compare Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1045
(9th Cir. 1994) (stating that Commonwealth Coatings is not a plurality opinion
because "Justice White said he joined in the 'majority opinion' but wrote to make
'additional remarks.' ") (quoting Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150, 151 n.*
(White, J., concurring)), and Crow Constr. Co. v. Jeffrey M. Brown Assoc. Inc., 264
F. Supp. 2d 217, 221 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (arguing that the Commonwealth Coatings
opinion was not a plurality opinion), with Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d
1344, 1358 n.19 (6th Cir. 1989) ("[11n view of Justice White's concurrence in
Commonwealth Coatings,the plurality's appearance of bias discussion should be
considered dicta." (citing Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council
Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 82-84 (2d Cir. 1984))).
28 Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150 (plurality opinion).
29 Id. at 150.
30 Id. at 148 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 524 (1927)).
31 Id. at 150 (White, J., concurring).
26

27

2007]

DISCLOSURE & DISQUALIFICATION STANDARDS

209

disqualification where such information is either disclosed or "the
relationship is trivial." 32 Later courts have indicated that a
"material" or "substantial" relationship is necessary to constitute
33
evident partiality requiring vacatur in nondisclosure cases.
Because it is generally accepted as a plurality opinion,
Commonwealth Coatings has left courts free to reject "evident
partiality" as the broad "appearance of bias" standard in favor of
(what has been interpreted as) Justice White's more narrow
standard requiring disclosure of relationships such that a
"reasonable person would ... conclude that an arbitrator was
partial."

34

II. ARBITRATION AWARDS AND DISCLOSURE GENERALLY
Recent statutory and standard revisions have sought to
clarify what arbitrators must disclose to preclude vacatur of an
arbitration award under "evident partiality." These revisions
were intended to encourage neutral (and sometimes non-neutral
or party-appointed) arbitrators' impartiality, 35 but have diverged
on how to review an arbitrator's nondisclosure and on the
appropriate remedies for such failures.
Nevertheless, these
efforts for clarity in disclosure have yet to evidence a drastic
change in the courts' opinions, particularly as it relates to
neutral arbitrators, who were (theoretically, although not always
32

Id.

This does not mean the judiciary must overlook outright chicanery in
giving effect to their awards; that would be an abdication of our
responsibility. But it does mean that arbitrators are not automatically
disqualified by a business relationship with the parties before them if both
parties are informed of the relationship in advance, or if they are unaware
of the facts but the relationship is trivial.
Id.
33 See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 647 (6th
Cir. 2005) (stating the rule that nondisclosure of a material relationship can
constitute evident partiality); Montez v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 260 F.3d 980, 983 (8th
Cir. 2001) (reiterating the conclusion from Commonwealth's concurrence that an
arbitrator must disclose substantial relationships); Skyview Owners Corp. v. Serv.
Employees Int'l Union, Local 32B-J, No. 04 Civ. 4643, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19986,
at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2004) (same).
34 Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit
Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Montez, 260 F.3d at 982 (noting
that courts have had a difficult time defining what constitutes "evident partiality").
35 See Olga K. Byrne, A New Code of Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators: The
Neutrality of Party-Appointed Arbitrators on a TripartitePanel, 30 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1815, 1816, 1823-27 (2003) (discussing the revision of the AAA/ABA Code of
Ethics that includes increased requirements of disclosure).
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in practice) being held to a higher standard of disclosure than
non-neutrals prior to enactments. 36 California courts have been
more aggressive in addressing arbitrators' failure to disclose.
Generally, courts give great deference to the decisions of
arbitrators 37 and there is a general presumption in favor of
upholding arbitration awards where challenged. 38 Arbitration
awards receive "one of the narrowest standards of judicial review
in all of American jurisprudence 39 in order to effectuate the
policy behind the FAA, which is to encourage arbitration as a
more inexpensive alternative to litigation. 40 This deference is
36 The Supreme Court in Commonwealth Coatings does not expressly indicate
whether party-appointed arbitrators are governed by the same standards as neutral
arbitrators. See Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 146-47 (plurality opinion)
(stating that the FAA shows Congress' desire "to provide not merely for any
arbitration but for an impartial one," but failing to expressly indicate whether
Congress' purported policy applies to all arbitrators or only to neutral arbitrators
like the particular individual whose conduct was at issue in that case). At least one
lower court has discussed the case as if it only applies to neutral arbitrators. See
Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617, 623 (7th Cir. 2002)
("The point of Commonwealth Coatings is that the sort of financial entanglements
that would disqualify a judge will cause problems for a neutral under § 10(a)(2)
unless disclosure is made .. ")(emphasis added), aff'd, 103 F. App'x 39 (7th Cir.
2004).
37 See Salem Hosp. v. Mass. Nurses Ass'n, 449 F.3d 234, 237 (1st Cir. 2006)
(citing United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37-38 (1987)
("The hallmark of federal court review of an arbitrator's decision is extreme
deference to the opinion of the arbitrator, whose interpretation of the contract has
been bargained for by the parties to the arbitration agreement.")); see also MERRICK
T. ROSSEIN, 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION §§ 13:68-69,
13:75.20 (2006).
38 See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 643 (6th
Cir. 2005) ("The [FAA] expresses a presumption that arbitration awards will be
confirmed."); JCI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42,
48 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting the "very deferential standard of review" that the court
must apply to arbitration decisions); Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 788 (8th
Cir. 2003) (same); George Day Constr. Co., v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 354,
722 F.2d 1471, 1477 (9th Cir. 1984) (same).
39 Nationwide Mutual, 429 F.3d at 643 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Home Ins. Co., 278 F.3d 621, 625 (6th Cir. 2002)).
40 See id. (reiterating judicial deference to arbitration decisions); U.S. SUP. CT.
DIG. tit. 26, § 2 (LexisNexis 2004) (stating that the purpose of the FAA is to "make
arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so, and to
make arbitration procedure, when selected by parties to contract, speedy, and not
subject to delay and obstruction in courts" (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967))); see also Alston & Cole-Alston v.
UBS Fin. Serv., Inc., No. 04-01798, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 656, at *4 n.2 (D.D.C.
Jan. 2, 2006) (stating that the purpose of arbitration is to provide a less complicated
alternative to litigation); Challenger Caribbean Corp. v. Union de Gen. de
Trabajadores de Puerto Rico, 903 F.2d 857, 862 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that the
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41
particularly high where parties choose the arbitrators.
The FAA establishes procedures for State and Federal
arbitration and provides that any party to arbitration may apply
to federal court for an order confirming an arbitration award
within one year after an award is made. 42 The court will confirm
an award unless it is modified, vacated, or corrected pursuant to
the limited reasons enumerated in sections 10 and 11.43 In
particular, section 10(a)(2) "authorize[s] vacation... 'where there
was evident partiality ...in the arbitrators.' "44 While courts
have treated arbitrator disclosure issues under section 10(a)(2),
there is no express provision guiding an arbitrator's failure to
disclose relationships or conflicts. 45 Disclosure issues have thus
been treated as either manifesting or providing evidence of

federal government has a policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration rather than
litigation); V.I. Nursing Ass'n Bargaining Unit v. Schneider, 668 F.2d 221, 223 (3d
Cir. 1981) (same).
41 Delta Mine Holding Co. v. AFC Coal Props., Inc. 280 F.3d 815, 823-24 (8th
Cir. 2001) (holding that where parties have agreed to party-appointed arbitrators,
awards should be confirmed unless it can be proved that a party's arbitrator's
partiality prejudicially affected award).
42 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000).
43 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000) reads:
In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon
the application of any party to the arbitration(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,
or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.
Id.
44 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147 (1968)
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2)).
45 AT&T v. United Computer Sys. Inc., 7 F. App'x 784, 788 (9th Cir. 2001)
("Failure to disclose information is not a ground for vacating an arbitration award
under the FAA."); Lee Korland, What an ArbitratorShould Investigate and Disclose:
Proposinga New Test for Evident Partiality Under the FederalArbitration Act, 53
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 815, 821 (2003) ("The FAA does not provide any standards for
arbitrators' conduct. Thus, any requirement that an arbitrator disclose potentially
disqualifying conflicts of interest or conduct an investigation to uncover such
conflicts stems from case law .... ).
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"evident partiality." 46 Case law generally provides the contours
of what constitutes adequate disclosure, even where voluntary
ethics codes provide for specific disclosures, to satisfy the
statutory requirement of evident partiality. This is a very fact47
intensive inquiry.
In federal courts, the circuits are split on what constitutes
"evident partiality," with some following the Supreme Court's
plurality in Commonwealth Coatings in adopting a standard
whereby a failure to disclose may be grounds for an arbitration
award vacatur where such a failure to disclose creates an
appearance or impression of bias. 48 In many circuits, this
standard is limited in favor of a more narrow reasonableness
'50
standard, 49 requiring "more than a mere appearance of bias"
such that an award will be vacated where the fact would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the arbitrator lacked

46

ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 499 (4th Cir. 1999)

('The material and relevant facts an arbitrator fails to disclose may demonstrate his
'evident partiality' under [the FAA]. However, nondisclosure, even of such facts, has
no independent legal significance and does not in itself constitute grounds for
vacating an award.").
47 Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 146 F.3d
1309, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 1998); Fed. Vending, Inc. v. Steak & Ale of Fla., Inc., 71
F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1246 (S.D. Fla. 1999) ("[The evident partiality inquiry [of the
FAA] is a case-specific and fact-intensive one.").
48 See, e.g., Woods v. Saturn Distrib. Corp., 78 F.3d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1996) ("In
nondisclosure cases, vacatur is appropriate where the arbitrator's failure to disclose
information gives the impression of bias in favor of one party."); Olson v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 51 F.3d 157, 159 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting
uncertainty among courts of appeals following the Commonwealth Coatings
decision).
49 See, e.g., GianelliMoney, 146 F.3d at 1312 (explaining awards may be vacated
only when an actual conflict exists or where a failure to disclose offends the
reasonable person standard); Lifecare Int'l, Inc. v. CD Med., Inc., 68 F.3d 429, 433
(11th Cir. 1995) (stating that the mere appearance of bias is insufficient to vacate an
arbitration award); Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council
Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1984) (adopting a reasonable
person standard); Int'l Produce, Inc. v. A/S Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir.
1981) (noting that appearance of bias does not necessarily rise to evident partiality).
50 Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1264 (7th Cir. 1992)
(citing Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171, 173 (2d Cir. 1984)) (noting that
arbitrators often have "interests and relationships that overlap with the matter they
are considering" and "[t]he mere appearance of bias that might disqualify judge will
not disqualify an arbitrator"); see also Evans Indus., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No.
01-1546, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10419, at *10 (E.D. La. July 12, 2001) (affirming an
arbitration award against a challenge of evident partiality where the arbitrator had
at one time owned interest in a partnership at issue, including earning commissions
(citing Berstein Seawell & Kove v. Bosarge, 813 F.2d 726, 732 (5th Cir. 1987))).
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partiality.5 1 Some courts find that there is not much distinction
between the two standards.
Courts are concerned with arbitrator partiality where there
may be an appearance of favoring industry, raising concerns of
the credibility and integrity of the arbitration process, and thus
providing the impetus for more stringent arbitrator disclosure
of relationships and prior dealings between parties and
arbitrators. 52 Further, because of an increasingly international
commercial market, a push toward greater arbitrator disclosure
and transparency places American arbitration standards more in
line with international standards.5 3
While the codes and
standards increase arbitrator responsibility through disclosure
standards, 54 most of these codes and federal and state courts tend
51

See, e.g., United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 99-6248, 2000 U.S.

App. LEXIS 19798, at *3 (2d Cir. Aug. 9, 2000); Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 F.3d 666,
669 (6th Cir. 2000); Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d
141, 146 (4th Cir. 1993).
52 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.85(a) (West 2006); Cal. Assemb. Comm. on
Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 475, 2001-2002 Reg. Sess. (Aug. 21, 2001)
(stating that the new California Ethics Code was promulgated "to provide [a] basic
measuref of consumer protection with respect to private arbitration, such as
minimal ethical standards and remedies for the arbitrator's failure to comply with
existing disclosure requirements"); see also UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT prefatory note
(2000) ("The UAA did not address many issues which arise in modern arbitration
cases. The statute provided no guidance as to... whether arbitrators are required to
disclose facts reasonably likely to affect impartiality .... ); American Bar
Association,
Dispute Resolution Policies, http://www.abanet.org/dispute/web
policy.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2007) ('"Recognizing that the 1977 Code had become
unresponsive to current concerns and provided inadequate guidance in numerous
respects," the committee convened to redraft that Code.); Order GrantingApproval
to a Proposed Rule Change Relating to Arbitrator Classificationand Disclosure in
NASD Arbitrations,69 Fed. Reg. 21,871 (Apr. 24, 2004) ("[T]he Commission believes
that the proposed rule change.., requires that NASD's rules be designed to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable
principles of trade, and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest.").
53 AAA/ABA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 7, Note on Neutrality (stating that an
expectation of neutrality "is essential in arbitrations where the parties, the nature of
the dispute, or the enforcement of any resulting award may have international
aspects"); see also Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the
Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 449, 460 (2005) ("At the urging of the
international arbitration bar-for whom American domestic practice was an
embarrassing aberration-the AAA and the ABA have recently revised their 'Code of
Ethics for Arbitrators.' ")
54 See AAAIABA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 7, Canon II.A (requiring
disclosure of "any known direct or indirect financial or personal interest in the
outcome of the arbitration" as well as of "any known existing or past financial,
business, professional or personal relationships which might reasonably affect
impartiality or lack of independence in the eyes of any of the parties"). In addition,
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to adopt objective standard for disclosure, which look at the
circumstances surrounding nondisclosure, and hold that a failure
to disclose does not per se demand vacatur of an arbitration
award. 55 In particular, some courts seem to be highlighting the
extent to which the nature of arbitration, as an industry-based
practice meant as an alternative to litigation, necessitates a
practical approach to disclosure. 56 Nevertheless, one recently
revised code goes so far as to require disclosure of potential
57
future conflicts.
Thus, there are conflicting trends. On the one hand is the
fear of arbitrator abuse of power, as they are not held to the same
standards of judges but yield similar power: arbitrators are not
mandated in most cases to publish opinions, but nevertheless
they decide issues of law and fact. 58 On the other hand, as noted
potential arbitrators are expected to "make a reasonable effort to inform" themselves

of any such interests or relationships of which they may happen to be ignorant. Id.
Canon II.B.
55 See, e.g., UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12, cmt. 3 (2000) ("The fundamental
standard of Section 12(a) is an objective one: disclosure is required of facts that a
reasonable person would consider likely to affect the arbitrator's impartiality in the
arbitration proceeding."); AAA/ABA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 7, Canon II (using
a reasonableness standard for disclosure); NASD MANUAL, supra note 8, R.
10312(d)(3) (using a reasonableness standard when assessing whether to disqualify
an arbitrator).
56 Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 579 F.2d 691, 701
(2d Cir. 1978) ('Fhe very intimacy of the group from which specialized arbitrators
are chosen suggests that the parties can justifiably be held to know at least some
kinds of basic information about an arbitrator's personal and business contacts.").
57 See CAL. ETHICS STDS., supra note 7, No. 10(b).
58 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)
("[W]e should, if anything, be even more scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of
arbitrators than judges, since the former have completely free rein ...").
See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., a case in which the plaintiff
argued that the procedures generally used in arbitration are suspect because
"arbitrators often will not issue written opinions," resulting in a lack of public
knowledge of employers' wrongdoings and an inability to obtain meaningful
appellate review. 500 U.S. 20, 31-32 (1991). The Court did not directly address
Gilmer's argument because the specific rules which governed his dispute mandated
that a writing be issued and made available to the public. Id.
One commentator suggested that the court misread the arbitration rules to
require a written "opinion" (providing an explanation of the arbitrator's reasoning
for the decision) when, in fact, only a written "award" was required. See Kaczmarek,
supra note 2, at 301-03 (arguing that public law arbitrators should be required write
opinions and release them). The AAA EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND
MEDIATION PROCEDURES R. 39 (2006) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION

RULES] provides that the award will be publicly available with the names of the
parties and witnesses redacted, unless the parties agree to include the names. Some
state statues require written decisions. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1283.4
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in Commonwealth Coatings, "arbitrators cannot sever all their
ties with the business world, since they are not expected to get all
their income from their work deciding cases .. ...59 The nature
of commercial arbitration requires particular knowledge and
''often entails the use of arbitrators that are closely connected to
the particular industry, and consequently, the parties
themselves." 60 This leads many to feel that those within a
61
particular industry may be predisposed to industry awards.
The AAA Employment Arbitration Rules require that the neutral
arbitrators be experienced in the field of employment law, 62 and
many of the arbitrators on the Employment Panel are attorneys
in law firms representing either employees or management or
previously were in those firms. Since the issues in employment
arbitration are frequently complex and involve numerous
statutes and common law developments, it is essential that
employment arbitrators are experts in this area of the law.
III. FAA AND FEDERAL INTERPRETATION OF "EVIDENT
PARTIALITY" IN DISCLOSURE CASES

While an arbitrator's failure to disclose is relevant to an
inquiry into arbitrator partiality, it alone is not always sufficient
to establish "evident partiality," as set forth in 9 U.S.C.
§ 10(a)(2). Many courts are unwilling to apply a per se rule of
vacation where an arbitrator fails to disclose information that a
party subsequently objects to as evidencing partiality. 63 Many
(West 2006).
59 Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 148-49.

60 Henry Gabriel & Anjanette H. Raymond, Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators:
Basic Principlesand Emerging Standards, 5 WYO. L. REV. 453, 454-55 (2005).
61 Susan Randall, Mandatory Arbitration in Insurance Disputes: Inverse
Preemption of the FederalArbitration Act, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 259 (2004).
As the [AAA] indicates, one of the "primary advantages" it offers is
"industry expertise," with "expert neutrals highly-trained in specific
industries." Knowledge of the insurance industry is a reasonable
requirement for an arbitrator of insurance disputes. However, experts
"highly trained in specific industries" often are or have been involved with
those industries rather than consumer groups and may be predisposed to
favor the industry or to see disputes from its perspective.
Id. (quoting American Arbitration Association, Focus Area, http://www.adr.orgl
FocusAreas (last visited Feb. 8, 2007)).
62 EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 58, R. 12(b)(i).
63 See, e.g., Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Tatung Co., 379 F.3d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 2004)
(noting that a per se rule would "make the results of arbitration less rather than
more certain and would run counter to the general policy of encouraging and
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courts will look to the nature of the nondisclosure to determine
64
evident partiality.
The Eleventh Circuit noted two times when an award will be
vacated due to "evident partiality": where there is actual bias or
where an arbitrator fails to disclose "information which would
lead a reasonable person to believe that a potential conflict
exists." 65 Under this standard, "evident partiality" is made out
by objective factors requiring a fact-intensive analysis of the
information that was not disclosed and its relationship to the
66
parties and the arbitration.
While one court has indicated that the "reasonable
appearance of bias" standard is more suited for cases involving
neutrals or differing governing rules, other than the FAA, 67 this
standard has been applied to cases involving both neutrals and
68
non-neutrals.
It is apparent that, "[s]ince the Commonwealth case, the
decisions of the circuit courts have not been a model of clarity as
to what must be shown to establish evident partiality" and what
arbitrators need to disclose to avoid vacatur. 69 In Morelite

supporting arbitration" (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24-25)); ANR Coal Co. v.
Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 499 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that nondisclosure
"does not in itself constitute grounds for vacating an award").
64 See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1643, United Mine Workers, 48 F.3d
125, 129 (4th Cir. 1995) ("We find it appropriate to apply to this case the evident
partiality standard for vacation developed by FAA case law."); Fed. Vending, Inc. v.
Steak & Ale of Fla., Inc., 71 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1249 (S.D. Fla. 1999) ("Indeed,
although failure to disclose circumstances which present a 'close-call' may not be
enough-in and of itself-to require setting aside an award, such failure at a
minimum requires that the court take a hard look at the nature of such undisclosed
circumstances.").
65 Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 146 F.3d
1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 1998).
66 See Int'l Produce, Inc. v. A/S Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir. 1980) ("To
vacate an arbitration award where nothing more than an appearance of bias is
alleged would be 'automatically to disqualify the best informed and most capable
potential arbitrators.'" (quoting Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co.,
393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968) (White, J., concurring))).
67 Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617, 620 (7th Cir.
2002) ("To the extent that an agreement entitles parties to select interested (even
beholden) arbitrators, § 10(a)(2) has no role to play.").
68 Consolidation Coal, 48 F.3d at 127, 129 (reversing a district court order to
vacate an arbitration award where a party-appointed arbitrator failed to disclose
that his brother had been employed by the defendant-union).
69 Evans Indus., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 01-1546, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10419, at *9 (E.D. La. July 12, 2001); see also Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York
City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1984)
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Construction Corp. v. New York City District Council Carpenters
Benefit Funds,70 the Second Circuit, "[m]indful of the trade-off
between expertise and impartiality, and cognizant of the
voluntary nature of submitting to arbitration," defined evident
partiality "as requiring a showing of something more than the
mere 'appearance of bias' to vacate an arbitration award," yet not
necessarily as impossible as "proof of actual bias." 71 There, the
petitioner moved to vacate an arbitration award claiming the
arbitrator was evidently partial when he failed to disclose the
father-son relationship between himself and one of the parties;
the son served as the arbitrator of a dispute involving a union
where the father was president.7 2 The court held that despite a
"traditional reluctance to inquire into the merits of an
arbitrator's award"73 such an intimate and undisclosed
relationship, where both were involved in the arbitration, would
lead "a reasonable person... to conclude that an arbitrator was
partial to one party to the arbitration."74 Family relationships,
75
however, do not per se show evident partiality.
("Exactly what constitutes 'evident partiality' by an arbitrator is a troublesome
question."). Lack of clarity on how to define evident partiality has also permeated
state courts. See, e.g., Schreifels v. Safeco Ins. Co., 725 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1986) (" 'Evident partiality,' like obscenity, is an elusive concept: one knows it
when one sees it, but it is awfully difficult to define in exact terms.").
70 748 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1984).
71 Id. at 83-84; see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d
640, 645 n.7 (6th Cir. 2006) (accepting the Second Circuit's interpretation of evident
partiality "as requiring a showing of something more than the mere 'appearance of
bias' to vacate an arbitration award, yet not as insurmountable as 'proof of actual
bias' "). See generally Montez v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 260 F.3d 980, 983 (8th Cir.
2001) (discussing the "absence of a consensus on the meaning" of "evident partiality"
evidenced by different approaches adopted by the circuits).
72 Morelite Construction,748 F.2d at 84.
73 Id. at 81.
74 Id. at 84.
75 Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1643, United Mine Workers, 48 F.3d 125, 130
(4th Cir. 1995) (reversing and remanding an arbitration award where the record did
not indicate specific facts that the nature of the relationship between an arbitrator
and his brother who worked for the defendant-appellant union was sufficiently
direct or had any relationship to the arbitration such that it established evident
partiality, and rejecting the district court finding of per se bias on the basis that the
relationship was between brothers); see also Fid. Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma Corp.,
386 F.3d 1306, 1310-14 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming district court order confirming
arbitration award and refusing to vacate due to evident partiality despite certain
family and business relationships between arbitrator and party); Barnstead v.
Ridder, 659 N.E.2d 753, 756 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (finding arbitrator's failure to
disclose business connections between his family and defendant's family not grounds
to vacate award).
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Reasonableness requires more than the appearance of bias
76
with facts that are not remote and which indicate partiality.
According to the Fourth Circuit, a court must look at the "nature
of the relationship and its connection to the arbitration
dispute . . . ."77 Factors that assist in this determination include:
(1) [A]ny personal interest, pecuniary or otherwise, the
arbitrator has in the proceeding;
[T]he directness of the relationship between the arbitrator
(2)
and the party he is alleged to favor;
[T]he connection of the relationship to the arbitration; and
(3)
[T]he proximity in time78between the relationship and the
(4)
arbitration proceeding.
In Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1643, United Mine
Workers of America, the court did not find evident partiality
where the non-prevailing party alleged that the arbitrator's
brother worked for the respondent-union. Applying the above
factors, the court reasoned that there was no interest on the part
of the arbitrator; the brother was not an elected official with the
union, had no responsibility for the union's contractual matters,
and had not been involved with the union since 1982; likewise,
the arbitrator had a history of ruling against the union.7 9 Thus,
even though the brother had, at one point, lived together and had
owned a business with his brother-arbitrator, where a
relationship is indirect, lacking a connection to the arbitration at
issue, and the arbitrator has nothing to gain, there is no evident
80
partiality.

76 Consolidation Coal, 48 F.3d at 129; see also Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v.
Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 141, 146 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he burden of a
claimant for vacation of an award due to 'evident partiality' is heavy, and the
claimant must establish specific facts that indicate improper motives on the part of
the arbitrator."); Health Serv. Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1264 (7th Cir.
1992) (finding that a prior business relationship between two people in the same
business, without any facts indicating such closeness or intimacy of relationship,
insufficient to warrant vacatur as establishing evident partiality); Boll v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 04-80031, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27948, at
*14 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2004) ("A trivial relationship is not sufficient to warrant
vacatur under 9 U.S.C. § 10(2)(a), in that by definition, the circumstances
surrounding a trivial relationship would be so attenuated that an impression of
partiality would not be reasonable.").
77 ConsolidationCoal, 48 F.3d at 129.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.

at 130.
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Moreover, partiality must be "direct, definite, and capable of
81
demonstration, rather than remote, uncertain or speculative."
82
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Home Insurance Co.,
the court confirmed an arbitration award against a charge that
the arbitrator was partial under the FAA alleging his failure "to
disclose certain business and social relationships with [Home
Insurance] and its counsel."83 Rejecting that nondisclosure per se
requires vacatur as well as the "appearance of bias" standard, the
court found the facts did not raise evident partiality. The parties'
agreement warranted "that the arbitrators come from within the
insurance industry" and therefore the parties clearly intended
84
that the panel be "involved in the business of insurance."
Citing the Seventh Circuit's decision in Sphere Drake Insurance
Ltd. v. All American Life Insurance Co., 8 5 the court highlighted
the nature of arbitration as industry-based, increasing the
likelihood that arbitrators, as members of an industry, will come
to be "repeat players" and "the panel will contain some actual or
potential friends, counselors, or business rivals of the parties.
Yet all participants may think the expertise-impartiality tradeoff
worthwhile; the Arbitration Act does not fasten on every industry
the model of the disinterested generalist judge."8 6 While this
case dealt specifically with a party-appointed arbitrator, the
same standard would apply (at least as a floor) to neutral

81 Id. at 129; see also Ormsbee Dev. Co. v. Grace, 668 F.2d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir.
1982) ("For an award to be set aside, the evidence of bias or interest of an arbitrator
must be direct, definite and capable of demonstration rather than remote, uncertain,
or speculative.").
82 429 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2006).
83 Id. at 644.
84 Id. at 645.
85 307 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2002).
86 Id. at 620; see also Nationwide Mutual, 429 F.3d at 647 (adopting the
standard in Sphere Drake and Morelite). The Court further highlighted the Sphere
Drake court's "cognizan[ce] of the practices and norms peculiar to industry
arbitration and incorporat[ion] [of] these considerations in its analysis" such that
disqualification of an arbitrator based on professional dealing would make finding a
qualified arbitrator difficult. Id.; see also Dow Corning Corp. v. Safety Nat'l Cas.
Corp., 335 F.3d 742, 750 (8th Cir. 2003) ('When the parties agree to arbitration
before disinterested persons who have experience in a specialized business or type of
problem, the relatively small number of qualified arbitrators may make it common,
if not inevitable, that parties will nominate the same arbitrators repeatedly.");
Teldata Control, Inc. v. County of Cook, No. 02-7439, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6076, at
*3 (N.D. Ill. April 14, 2003) ("[S]ection 10(a)(2) does not inexorably require a
disinterested arbitrator.").
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arbitrators.87 The court indicated that even if Jacks, the
arbitrator, had been a neutral umpire, it would not have found
evident partiality because Jacks disclosed that he had served as
Home's arbitrator on matters over twenty years, including as an
opposing arbitrator, among other things. Nationwide agreed to
continue and later claimed these disclosures deficient but failed
to show "how the substance of these disclosures ...and his prior
and ongoing contacts with Home and [others] ...manifest
88
evident partiality" under the FAA.
The district court in Evans Industries, Inc. v. Lexington
Insurance Co. 89 found any relationship between the umpire and a
party-appointed arbitrator too indirect to warrant vacatur under
Section 10(a)(2). 90 The arbitrator was unaware of the connection
between the defendant and its parent company, AIG, whom the
arbitrator used to represent. Even had the arbitrator been
aware, the contacts between the parent company and subsidiary
were "too indirect to establish anything more than a possible
appearance of bias, which the Fifth Circuit has rejected as
insufficient to establish evident partiality."9 1
The court
reiterated the factors indicated above and the general policy that
the court "will not lightly overturn an arbitration award for
evident partiality,"92 while noting nondisclosure is clearly
relevant to a determination evident partiality. The Fourth
93
Circuit found that it does not independently justify vacatur.
94
In Ormsbee Development Co. v. Grace, the Tenth Circuit,
under the New Mexico Arbitration Act (which mirrors the
Federal Arbitration Act in the provisions for award vacation)
found no partiality on the part of a neutral arbitrator where he
had similar clients to one of the party's firm, because the
relationship was too indirect. 95 While he disclosed that he did
87 See Nationwide Mutual, 429 F.3d at 645 ('We conclude that the present
circumstances do not warrant deviation from Apperson's case-by-case objective
inquiry into evident partiality, particularly where, as here, the complaint of evident
partiality concerns a party-appointed, as opposed to a neutral, arbitrator.").
88 Id. at 649.
89 No. 01-1546, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10419 (E.D. La. July 12, 2001).
90 See id. at "13-14.
91 Id. at *14 (citing Bernstein

Seawell & Kove v. Bosarge, 813 F.2d 726, 732 (5th

Cir. 1987)).
92 Id. at *10.
93 Id. at*11.
94 668 F.2d 1140 (10th Cir. 1982).
95 See id. at 1151.
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consulting work for another corporation, he did not indicate that
that corporation was a subsidiary. 96 The court noted that the
arbitrator was not financially involved with the parties or their
97
subsidiaries.
A.

Courts Highlight Factors Such as FinancialInterest,
Contemporaneity,and the Nature of a Relationship

As the case law demonstrates, where a potential conflict
involves a financial or other interest to the arbitrator, is
contemporaneous or close in time to the arbitration and/or
exemplifies some significant relationship, courts require
vacatur. 98 In Montez v. PrudentialSecurities,Inc.,99 an employee
appealed a final order denying his petition to vacate an
arbitration award in favor of the employer claiming that the
arbitrator, James Benson, showed evident partiality. 10 0
In
particular, petitioner-employee claimed that Benson's failure to
disclose that he was employed with two separate firms, five years
ago, that did business with the respondent-employer's attorney's
firm, Baker and Botts, warranted vacatur. 10 1 The Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's determination that the
Benson's undisclosed business and professional relationship with
the Prudential did not show "evident partiality" where "Benson
[did not have] any financial interest related to Baker & Botts," he
was neither a shareholder nor had "anything to gain from
fostering a relationship," his current employer did not have
dealings with the parties, and the relationship "ended five years
1 02
prior to the arbitration."'
Id. at 1149-50.
97 Id. at 1151.
98 See, e.g., Sanford Home for Adults v. Local 6, IFHP, 665 F. Supp. 312, 320
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[1]n evaluating the purported bias of an arbitrator, the courts look
at: (1) the financial interest the arbitrator has in the proceeding; (2) the directness
of the alleged relationship between the arbitrator and a party to the arbitration
proceeding; (3) and the timing of the relationship with respect to the arbitration
proceeding.").
99 260 F.3d 980 (8th Cir. 2001).
100 Id. at 981.
101 Id. at 982.
102 Id. at 983-84; see also Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 680
(7th Cir. 1983) (holding that mere nondisclosure does not warrant vacatur under
§ 10(a)(2) where an arbitrator failed to disclose that he once worked for the plaintiffs
president at a different insurance company since "their relationship had ended 14
years before, [the arbitrator] had no possible financial stake in the outcome of the
arbitration, and his relationship with [the president] during their period together at
96
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1.

Financial Interest Will Generally Constitute "Evident
Partiality"
Financial interest or evidence that the arbitrator had
anything to gain from the outcome of the arbitration is strong
evidence of partiality. 1 3 "Certainly any time money changes
hands directly between an arbitrator and a representative of one
of the parties involved in a pending arbitration before that
arbitrator, disclosure must take place.' 10 4
Even where a
relationship exists, a court may deny vacatur if there is no
105
pecuniary interest involved.
2.

Temporal Proximity

The relationship between the time of a conflict alleged to
affect an arbitrator's partiality and the arbitration at issue is
relevant to a determination of evident partiality. 0 6 In Crow
Construction Co. v. Jeffrey M. Brown Associates, Inc., 10 7 an
arbitration award by a three AAA-appointed panel of arbitrators
was vacated when an arbitrator failed to disclose that she had
served as a mediator for the prevailing party only a short time
08
prior to the arbitration at issue, among other nondisclosures.
Cosmopolitan had been distant and impersonal").
103 See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151
(1968).
The arbitration process functions best when an amicable and trusting
atmosphere is preserved and there is voluntary compliance with the decree,
without need for judicial enforcement. This end is best served by
establishing an atmosphere of frankness at the outset, through disclosure
by the arbitrator of any financial transactions which he has had or is
negotiating with either of the parties.
Id.; see also Montez, 260 F.3d at 984.
104 Crow Constr. Co. v. Jeffrey M. Brown Assoc. Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 217, 225
(E.D. Pa. 2003).
105 Sanford Home for Adults v. Local 6, IFHP, 665 F. Supp. 312, 320-21
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (denying motion to vacate arbitration award, because arbitrator's
relationship with employer's counsel did not reach evident partiality and neither did
the relationship since there was no pecuniary interest involved).
106 See HSMV Corp. v. ADI Ltd., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 1999)
(holding that the arbitrator's failure to disclose his law firm's contemporaneous
representation of the Commonwealth of Australia, which owned one of the corporate
parties to the arbitration, constituted evident partiality); see also In re First Quality
Realty LLC, No. 02-14758, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 479, at *16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17,
2006) (finding an arbitrator's request and acceptance of perks from a law firm
representing one of the parties while he was involved in the arbitration sufficient
grounds, without disclosure, that the arbitrator was partial under Section 10(a)(2)).
107 264 F. Supp. 2d 217 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
108 Id. at 224.
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There were four nondisclosures in total:
(1) respondent's
counsel's (Cohen's) appearance before the arbitrators on a
previous matter; (2) one arbitrator's role in a case involving the
respondent; (3) another arbitrator's failure to disclose his private
dealings with the party's counsel as a hired arbitrator; and
(4) both arbitrators' failure to disclose their roles in another
related matter of respondents. 10 9 On the first issue, the court
determined that opposing counsel's appearance in a previous
AAA-arbitrated matter before two of the arbitrators was an
example of the trivial relationships alluded to by Justice White in
his Commonwealth Coatings concurrence and thus did not rise to
the level of evident partiality. 110 However, citing to the AAA
Ethics Code providing a continuing duty to disclose relationships
with the parties, although not governing, the court used it "as a
benchmark to assess the alleged failed disclosures" and in its
determination that the later two nondisclosures amounted to
evident partiality. The court found that the arbitrators' more
extensive undisclosed ties with the respondent and his counsel's
firm, Cohen Seglias, suggested bias. The arbitrator's role as a
mediator in a case involving respondent occurred near the same
time as the arbitration at issue and the other's failure to disclose
his private dealings with Cohen Seglias was significant because
Cohen Seglias was hired and paid as an arbitrator in 1999.
"[M]ost disturbing is the arbitrators' failure to disclose to Crow
their role in the JMB/Greenfield arbitration .... [1]t occurred at

the conclusion of the JMB/Crow matter, a crucial time in which
the arbitrators were presumably making their determinations as
to liability and damages."11 '
3.

Business and Law Firm Relationships

Under the reasonable standard, the extent to which a party's
previous business ties or other relationships to an arbitrator's
firm evidences "evident partiality" differs depending on the facts.
An arbitrator's prior non-legal relationship with a named partner
in the firm of an attorney representing a party does not
necessary require vacatur. 11 2 There needs to be a relationship
109 Id.
110 Id. (citing Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145,
150 (1968) (White, J., concurring)).
112 Id.at 225.

112 See Skyview Owners Corp. v. Employees Int'l Union, Local 32B-J, No. 04-
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with someone involved in the arbitration proceeding and a charge
that the arbitrator "stood to benefit from the outcome of the
proceeding." ' 1 3 "[F]amiliarity due to confluent areas of expertise
does not indicate bias.
Rather, so long as the previous
interactions do not represent part of an ongoing business
relationship," such familiarity with an industry more than likely
presents an asset in the context of arbitration. 114 In ANR Coal
Co. v. Cogentrix of North Carolina, Inc.,115 the court found a
relationship between a neutral arbitrator and respondent's
counsel's firm to be "nonsubstantial," and thus not warranting
vacatur of an arbitration award. 1 6 The neutral arbitrator was a
former member of a firm that had represented one of the parties
for a brief period of time during a temporary merger. 117 The
petitioner failed to demonstrate "that a reasonable person would
have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to the other party
18
to the arbitration." 1
Vacatur was appropriate in a bankruptcy case where an
arbitrator who "regularly went to lunch with one of the [party's]
attorneys," was provided with free use of conference rooms and
free legal research and was retained to represent a principal of
the opposing party during the arbitration in question. 1 9
In another case, the Eleventh Circuit found that although
the arbitrator should have disclosed a prior, personal dispute
4643, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19986, at *18-20 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2004) (holding that
vacatur of the award was not required where the arbitrator and a partner of a firm
involved in the arbitration formerly co-owned a restaurant).
113 Id. at *18; see also Sanford Home for Adults v. Local 6, IFHP, 665 F. Supp.
312, 321-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (rejecting the argument that a prior business
relationship between an arbitrator and a party's counsel requires vacation of an
arbitration award).
114 Univ. Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Constructors Inc., 304 F.3d 1331,
1340 (1 1th Cir. 2002) (finding that the petitioners made out two separate prima facie
cases for vacatur under evident partiality where an arbitrator failed to disclose a
concurrent business relationship with one of the parties' lawyer and a meeting with
the president of the same party).
115 173 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 1999).
116 See id. at 499-500.
117 See id. at 496.
118 Id. at 500, 502 (quoting Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1643, United Mine
Workers, 48 F.3d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 1995)); see also Al-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85
F.3d 680, 682-83 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (refusing to vacate the arbitration award where
the arbitrator's former law firm represented respondent Citibank on unrelated
matters).
119 See In re First Quality Realty, LLC., No. 02-14758, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 479,
at *16-17, *20 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2006).
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with an attorney belonging to firm representing the respondent,
nondisclosure of this fact did not create reasonable impression of
partiality where the incident did not involve any party to the
arbitration hearing and occurred eighteen months prior to
120
arbitration.
The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, overturned an appellate
panel's ruling that found evident partiality based on a dated and
121
limited contact between one of the arbitrators and counsel.
The arbitration involved a software licensing dispute. 122 After
the award was issued, the losing party examined the arbitrator's
professional history and discovered that his prior law firm and
the winning party's firm had represented Intel in a large dispute
involving six different litigations in the early 1990s. 123 At least
seven firms and thirty-four lawyers represented Intel in that
matter, including the arbitrator and counsel for the prevailing
party in the litigation. 124 Although their names appeared in the
pleadings together, the arbitrator and counsel never spoke to
each other or attended the same meetings, hearings, or other
proceedings together. 125 The majority of the en banc court
concluded that the arbitrator's "failure to disclose a trivial former
126
business relationship does not require vacatur of the award."'
The majority found this "slender connection" between the
arbitrator and counsel to not have met the standard for bias set
forth in prior cases, noting that courts in previous cases had
refused to vacate where the undisclosed connections were much
stronger. 127
The court reasoned that allowing vacatur in this case would
jeopardize the finality of arbitration awards and would provide
an incentive for the losing party to scrutinize the arbitrator's
background to discover trivial relationships upon which to

120 See Lifecare Int'l, Inc. v. CD Med., Inc., 68 F.3d 429, 434 (11th Cir. 1995)
(citing Int'l Produce, Inc. v. A/S Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548, 551 n.3 (2d Cir. 1981) ("It
does not follow that an arbitrator's personal feelings in favor of or against one
attorney would necessarily be transferred to another attorney in the same firm.")).
121 See Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 476
F.3d 278, 283-84 (5th Cir. 2007), rev'g en banc 436 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2006).
122 See id. at 279.
123 See id. at 280.
124 Id.
125 See id. at 284.
126 Id. at 283.
127 See id. at 284.
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challenge the award. 128 To warrant vacatur, the court found that
the alleged nondisclosure must create "a concrete, not speculative
impression of bias." 129 The majority concluded that "[a]rbitration
may have flaws, but this is not one of them. The draconian
remedy of vacatur is only warranted upon nondisclosure that
involves a significant compromising relationship. This case does
30
not come close to meeting this standard."'
"[R]epresentation of a parent corporation is likely to affect
impartiality or may create an appearance of partiality in the
lawyer's representation of or dealings with a subsidiary."''
As
well, in HSMV Corp. v. ADI Ltd., 32 the Ninth Circuit found
evident partiality where a firm at which an arbitrator was a
partner had been representing a parent company in a move to
privatize another company, ADI, who was a party in the
arbitration proceeding. 133 The relationship at issue commenced
prior to the arbitration and continued during the arbitration.
Even though ADI's counsel had sent a proposed confidentiality
deed for the two parties which indicated that questions should be
addressed by an attorney at Blake Dawson, the arbitrator's firm,
the court did not find it sufficient to waive the arbitrator's
1 34
obligation to disclose the relationship.
In Al-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 3 5 the court affirmed a lower
court's finding of no evident partiality on a motion to vacate an
arbitration award. 36 The parties agreed to Kenneth R. Feinberg
as the arbitrator to the claim. After dissatisfaction with the
award, Al-Harbi brought an action for vacatur claiming that
Feinberg was partial in failing to disclose that his former law
firm had represented Citibank on unrelated matters. 37 The
court declined to find the relationship warranting vacatur where
it was not direct, definite, or a relationship contemporaneous to

See id. at 285.
Id. at 286.
130 Id.
131 Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 1994).
132 72 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
133 See id. at 1132.
134 See id. at 1124-25, 1132.
135 85 F.3d 680 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
136 Id. at 681.
137 See id. at 682.
128

129
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the arbitration and Feinberg was no longer a member of the firm
that had represented Citibank. 138
The fact that an arbitrator comes from the same industry
does not show evident partiality, even where an arbitrator and a
party are rivals. 139 Membership in the same trade association,
likewise, is not sufficiently direct or substantial to establish
evident partiality.140
IV. ARBITRATOR LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF
UNDISCLOSED CONFLICT

A.

Failureto Investigate

Generally, an award will not be vacated for a mere failure to
investigate, unless the undisclosed facts make out "evident
partiality." In Al-Harbi, the court found that:
[T]he fact that an arbitrator has not conducted an investigation
sufficient to uncover the existence of facts marginally
disclosable under the Commonwealth Coatings duty is not
sufficient to warrant vacating an arbitration award for evident
partiality. That is, we explicitly hold that there is no such duty
141
on an arbitrator to make any such investigation.

138

See id. at 682-83; see also Int'l Produce, Inc. v. A/S Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548,

551-52 (2d Cir. 1981) (denying a motion to vacate an arbitration award under
evident partiality where the arbitrator in one dispute was also a non-party witness
in another dispute involving the same law firms).
139 See JCI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42,
51 (1st Cir. 2003) (affirming the district court's confirmation of an arbitration award
in the union's favor where the employer was on notice that the arbitration panel
would be comprised of industry people and that "some of [its] competitors could be
the employer representatives on the panel" but failed to inquire about the
arbitrator's background). Similarly, evident partiality requires "more than an
amorphous institutional predisposition." Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co.,
429 F.3d 640, 645 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Andersons, Inc. v. Horton Farms, Inc., 166
F.3d 308, 329 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that the fact that the arbitrators were all
members of the National Grain & Feed Association ("NGFA") was insufficient to
establish evident partiality under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) even where Andersons, but not
Horton Farms, was a member of NGFA)).
140 Norwood Co. v. Bennett Composites, Inc., No. 04-CV-0379, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17153, at *3-5, *13 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2004) (denying vacatur on evident
partiality grounds where the arbitrator failed to disclose a relationship between his
son and a witness because the relationship was "one that occurs in the normal
course of business [between] individuals who are involved in an industry [or] are
members of a trade association").
141 Al-Harbi, 85 F.3d at 683.
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There are a few courts, however, that have held that the
failure to investigate per se requires vacatur. 142 In Schmitz v.
Zilveti,143 the Ninth Circuit held that a lawyer-neutral arbitrator
had a duty to investigate his law firm's prior relationship with
the corporate parent of a party. Where the arbitrator's law firm
represented the parent of one of the corporate parties, but the
arbitrator only ran a conflict check for the corporate party, the
court found that the arbitrator had constructive knowledge of the
conflict and his failure to inform the parties resulted in a
reasonable impression of partiality meriting vacatur. 144 Thus, in
concomitance to a duty to disclose under Ninth Circuit case law,
a neutral arbitrator also has an independent duty to investigate
conflicts with parties because, while a lack of knowledge may
preclude an actual conflict, "a reasonable impression of partiality
can form when an actual conflict of interest exists and the lawyer
has constructive knowledge of it."145 The court also relied on the
NASD Code, 146 which requires an arbitrator to investigate
potential conflicts.
B.

ObligationAfter Conflict Becomes Known to ArbitratorAfter
Non-Disclosure

Arbitrators are under an ongoing obligation to disclose
information that might make them partial. The Ninth Circuit
has held that an award may be vacated for nondisclosure if those
facts create a "reasonable impression of partiality" even where
such facts are unknown to the arbitrator.147 Even where an
142

See, e.g., Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 1994).

143

Id.

See id. at 1049.
at 1048. But see ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493,
499-500 (4th Cir. 1999) ("ANR has failed to cite a single case holding that a failure
to disclose in violation of the arbitration rules constitutes an independent basis for
vacatur absent proof that, in addition, the nondisclosure proves one of the statutory
grounds for vacatur.").
146 See Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1049. For the current version of this section, see
NASD MANUAL, supranote 8, R. 10312(b).
147 See Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1049. The court stated:
[A]n arbitrator may have a duty to investigate independent of its
Commonwealth Coatings duty to disclose. A violation of this independent
duty to investigate may result in a failure to disclose that creates a
reasonable impression of partiality under Commonwealth Coatings. For
instance, the parties can expect a lawyer/arbitrator to investigate and
disclose conflicts he has with actual parties to the arbitration.
Id. at 1048.
144

145 Id.
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arbitrator may believe a relationship to be trivial, "if the law
148
requires the disclosure, no such imputation can arise."
149
Many courts, however, have not taken this harsh stance.
In Norwood Co. v. Bennett Composites, Inc.,150 the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania refused to overturn the plaintiffs
arbitration award on nondisclosure grounds under section
10(a)(2), where an arbitrator's son and one of the parties were

members of the same organization.1 5 1 The court addressed
whether either the failure of the arbitrator to investigate
potential conflicts or, subsequent to discovery of a relationship,
the arbitrator's failure to disclose such relationships, demanded
vacatur.
On the first issue, the court found that as the
arbitrator-father was not aware of the relationship until after
arbitration began and shortly prior to the decision being
rendered, he could not have disclosed it prior to arbitration, but
also that an arbitrator is not responsible for disclosing the
relationships of third parties.1 52 Allowing vacatur for mere
failure to investigate "would permit vacatur even where the
arbitrator had no connections to the parties or the subject of the
arbitration."1 5 3 And, a failure to investigate would not change

148

Id.

See, e.g., Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Servs.,
Inc., 146 F.3d 1309, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Al-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85 F.3d 680,
682-83 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The court stated in Gianelli Money:
In Lifecare Int'l, Inc. v. CD Medical, Inc...... [b]ecause there was no
evidence that the arbitrator had actual knowledge of the past contacts, we
confirmed the arbitration award and rejected the proposition that the
arbitrator had a duty to investigate the past contacts to avoid evident
partiality. In the present case it was error for the district court to rely on
Schmitz, because its holding that an arbitrator's failure to investigate past
contacts with one of the parties may constitute "evident partiality" is
squarely at odds with the position we took in Lifecare.
146 F.3d at 1312 (citation omitted).
150 No. 04-CV-0379, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17153 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2004).
151 See id., at *8, *14.
152 See id. at *10, *14; see also Team Scandia, Inc. v. Greco, 6 F. Supp. 2d 795,
803 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (dismissing a motion to vacate the arbitration award where the
arbitrator disclosed his former legal representation of a third party who was not
bound by the arbitration because this was not a disqualifying conflict of interest).
153 Lummus Global Amazonas, S.A. v. Aguaytia Energy Del Peru, S.R. Ltda.,
256 F. Supp. 2d 594, 624 n.14 (S.D. Tex. 2002), modified by No. H-01-495, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21885 (S.D. Tex. July 16, 2002) (revising the form of the final
judgment).
149
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the fact that there was no relationship "to give rise to evident
154
partiality."
The Eleventh Circuit has held that there is no independent
duty to investigate under the FAA where an arbitrator is
unaware of the undisclosed facts. 155 In Gianelli Money Purchase
Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Services, Inc., the court held that
evident partiality required that an actual conflict exist or "the
arbitrator knows of, but fails to disclose, information which
would lead a reasonable person to believe that a potential conflict
exists."'156 In an attempt to recover money lost from investments,
Gianelli filed a claim against ADM with the AAA. 157 After the
parties jointly selected an arbitrator, but before the arbitration
began, Gianelli discovered that the arbitrator's firm had
represented the president of Basic, with whom ADM had
contracted to do its trading. 5 8
After assurances from the
arbitrator that he was unaware of that case, he indicated that he
had no more disclosures. 59 The arbitration proceeded and the
arbitrator found for ADM.160 Contending that he had discovered
that the president of Basic had more frequent contact with the
firm than originally stated, Gianelli appealed. The court found
that the facts did not indicate any partiality that was "'direct,
definite and capable of demonstration rather than remote,
uncertain and speculative.' 1161 The court stated that the district
court mistakenly relied on Schmitz and found that because the
arbitrator had no knowledge of the conflict, there could not be a
failure to disclose and therefore no evident partiality. 62 The
court looked not to the fact of nondisclosure, but to the nature of
154 Evans Indus., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 01-1546, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10419, at *14 (E.D. La. July 12, 2001).
155 See Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 146
F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Lummus Global Amazonas, 256 F. Supp. 2d at
624 n.14 (citing Al-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85 F.3d 680, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
Whether or not an award is vacated does not need to be decided unless "this court
first finds that the undisclosed facts show 'clear evidence of impropriety,' or, at the
very least, a reasonable impression of bias." Lummus Global Amazonas, 256
F. Supp. 2d at 624 n.14.
156 Gianelli Money, 146 F.3d at 1312.
157 Id. at 1310.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 See id. at 1312-13 (quoting Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d
1197, 1202 (11th Cir. 1982)).
162 See id.
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that nondisclosure: An arbitrator cannot be guilty of "evident
partiality" by reason of past business contacts between his
employer and the interested party, absent actual knowledge of
163
real or potential conflict of interest.
V.

RECENT CHANGES IN DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

While the FAA provides the basis for the review of an
arbitration award, 164 the parties' agreement may provide the
rules, usually an agreed upon institutional code or guiding
statute,' 65 to guide the arbitration and arbitrators. 16 6
This
167
includes, in particular, standards for arbitrator disclosure.
Where there is no agreement, the FAA and the UAA are meant to
act as default standards, particularly where there are questions
about the vacation of an award due to "evident partiality.' 68
Where a party is challenging an arbitrator's failure to disclose,
the FAA may preempt a state arbitration act where there is a
conflict of substantive law. 69 The language of many state UAA's
comports with the FAA as far as federal courts have defined

163

See id.; see also ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 502

(4th Cir. 1999); Evans Indus., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 01-1546, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10419, at *15-16 (E.D. La. July 12, 2001).
164 See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000). The FAA, however, does not create federal question
jurisdiction. Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 291 n.1 (3d Cir.
2001) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26
n.32 (1983)).
165 See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995)
(noting that the FAA does not operate in isolation from the wishes of the parties);
ANR Coal, 173 F.3d at 499 ("[D]etermining whether to set aside an arbitration
award, a court may only consider whether the complaining party has demonstrated
a violation of the governing statute.").
166 See, e.g., Diemaco v. Colt's Mfg. Co., 11 F. Supp. 2d 228, 232 (D. Conn. 1998)
("'When parties agree to arbitrate before the AAA and incorporate the Commercial
Arbitration Rules [CAR] into their agreement, they are bound by those rules and by
the AAA's interpretation.").
167 See U.S. Care, Inc. v. Pioneer Life Ins. Co. of Ill., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1062
(C.D. Cal. 2002) ("A court cannot require a higher level of impartiality than is
provided for by the parties in an arbitration agreement.").
168 See, e.g., P.R. Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir.
2005) (affirming the district court's finding that the parties of a contract were
subject to the FAA because there was no explicit language indicating the parties
intent to subject the arbitration award to another standard).
169 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND.
L.J. 393, 393-95 (2004) (indicating that while there has been little treatment on
federal preemption under the Federal Arbitration Act, a "second generation" of cases
has begun to emerge).
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"evident partiality" in the context of disclosure 170 even where also
providing for additional language. 17 1 Unless codified, ethics
codes are "voluntary," such as the one promulgated by the
American Arbitrators Association and the American Bar
Association ("AAA/ABA").' 72 As such, these codes do not have the
1 73
force of law unless codified by Congress or a state legislature.
A.

AAA/ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitratorsin Commercial
Disputes-A Summary of Changes and Constants

In March 2004, the AAA/ABA adopted the Revised Code of
Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators. 174 The revised rules extend
a presumption of neutrality to all arbitrators where it was
formerly (if not obviously) only applicable to neutral
arbitrators. 175 Unless a parties' intent 76 or applicable law
dictates otherwise, neutral and non-neutral arbitrators will be
presumed neutral.1 77 This places the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics
more parallel to international arbitration standards.' 7 8 This
170 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 572.08-572.30 (1951), cited in Lee v. Chica, 983
F.2d 883, 888 n.11 (8th Cir. 1993) ("The UAA contains language similar to FAA
Sections 10 and 11. Thus, our conclusions would be the same if we were to apply the
UAA here...."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-301 (2005).
171 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 435.405, cited in Madden v. Kidder Peabody &
Co., 833 S.W.2d 79, 82 n.7 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) ("The UAA does contain additional
language not present in the FAA.... It appears, then, that the UAA has a higher
statutory standard than the FAA.").
172 See AAA ARBITRATOR DISCLOSURE, supra note 7.
173 See Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 680-81 (1983).
174 Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Revised Code of Ethics for Arbitrators Approved,
Takes Effect, http://www.adr.org/codeofethics (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
175 See AAA/ABA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 7, Canon VII. The Code also
identifies three-member panel arbitrations where predisposition is assumed. They
are referred to as "Canon X arbitrators" and, while they still have ethical
obligations, they are not presumed neutral. See id. Canon IV.B.
176 See Bruce Meyerson & John M. Townsend, Revised Code of Ethics for
Commercial Arbitrators Explained, 59 DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.-Apr. 2004, at 10, 12
("[Slome parties ... are likely to continue to prefer that their party-appointed
arbitrators not be neutral.").

177

See AAAJABA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 7, Canon IX.A (inferring that

parties can opt out of a presumption of neutrality); see also, e.g., Universal Reins.
Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 16 F.3d 125, 127 (7th Cir. 1994).
178 See Byrne, supra note 35, at 1825-26; Meyerson & Townsend, supra note
176, at 12 (observing that the concept of neutrality is meant to actuate a greater
sense of "independence and impartiality," and placing it on par with a more globally
held belief in that all proceedings, arbitrators should be as independent and as
impartial as possible); John M. Townsend, Clash and Convergence on Ethical Issues
in InternationalArbitration, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 8 (2004) ("As [a
presumption of neutrality] is the prevailing international standard, this 180-degree
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presumption-shifting has also been amended in the AAA
Commercial Arbitration Rules, 179 specifically Rules 12(b) and 16,
which guide party-appointed arbitrators and disclosure,
18 0
respectively.
The specific disclosures required are the same as the 1977
Ethics Code, just now they also apply to non-neutrals (again,
except where Canon X arbitrators are permitted otherwise or the
parties agree differently). Some of the relationships within the
scope of disclosure include any direct or indirect financial
interest in the outcome of the arbitration 8l and relationships
that might affect impartiality. 182
The "reasonable effort"
remained the same. 8 3
self-information
arbitrator
for
standard
Potentially relevant is the ABA/AAA decision not to
transplant the "Introductory Note" from the 1977 Ethics Codes
into the new one. In pertinent part, the Note had suggested that
the Code provisions:
[Aire intended to be applied realistically so that the burden of
detailed disclosure does not become so great that it is
impractical for persons in the business world to be arbitrators,
thereby depriving parties of the services of those who might be
best informed and qualified to decide particular types of
cases. 184

The Ethics Code does not mention nondisclosure as a ground
for disqualification. Rather, it lists more general concepts such
as partiality and lack of good faith, which may incorporate
disclosure.1 8 5 Generally, the language of the disclosure section
reversal of the presumption of non-neutrality effectively brings American arbitration
into line with the international practice.").
179 See AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES R. 12(b), 16

(2005), availableat http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440 [hereinafter AAA RULES].
180 Under Rule 12, unless specified that they are to be non-neutral, a partyappointed arbitrator must meet the standards in Rule 17 of impartiality and
independence. See id. at R. 12, 17.
is'See AAA/ABA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 7, Canon II.A(1).
182 See id. Canon II.A(2).
183 See id. Canon II.B.
184 Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 1983)
(quoting the former Code's provisions for disclosure as meant to be applied
realistically to obviate impracticality). Compare AAA/ABA CODE OF ETHICS, supra
note 7, Note on Neutrality.
185 AAA RULES, supra note 179, R. 17.
(a) Any arbitrator shall be impartial and independent and shall perform his
or her duties with diligence and in good faith, and shall be subject to
disqualification for
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does not indicate mandatory disclosure18 6 and the failure to
provide an express remedy for a failure to disclose does not
provide the revised Ethics Code the force that, even where
codified, maybe it was intended. Finally, the Code incorporates a
waiver rule that applies to all proceedings adopting AAA

procedures. 187
In one of the only cases to cite the newly revised code,
Applied Industrial Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve
8 8 the court vacated an arbitration award for the failure
Sanayi,1
of a neutral arbitrator to disclose. 8 9 The court looked at the
parties' Submission Agreement, which provided the terms of
disclosure and a waiver provision; specifically that "No arbitrator
shall accept an appointment or sit on a Panel, where the
arbitrator or the arbitrator's current employer has a direct or
indirect interest in the outcome of the arbitration."'190 The court
relied on the "broad standards for disclosure" in the Submission
Agreement, the AAAIABA Code of Ethics, and the International
Bar Association's Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in
International Arbitration, 191 holding that the award should be

(i) partiality or lack of independence,
(ii) inability or refusal to perform his or her duties with diligence and
in good faith, and
(iii) any grounds for disqualification provided by applicable law. The
parties may agree in writing, however, that arbitrators directly
appointed by a party pursuant to Section R-12 shall be nonneutral, in
which case such arbitrators need not be impartial or independent and
shall not be subject to disqualification for partiality or lack of
independence.
(b) Upon objection of a party to the continued service of an arbitrator, or on
its own initiative, the AAA shall determine whether the arbitrator should
be disqualified under the grounds set out above, and shall inform the
parties of its decision, which decision shall be conclusive.
Id.
186 See AAA/ABA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 7, Canon II.A ("Persons who are
requested to serve as arbitrators should, before accepting, disclose .... "(emphasis
added)).
187 See AAA RULES, supra note 179, R. 37 ("Any party who proceeds with the
arbitration after knowledge that any provision or requirement of these rules has not
been complied with and who fails to state an objection in writing shall be deemed to
have waived the right to object.").
188 No. 05-10540, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44789 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2006).
189 See id. at *28.
190 Id. at *3 (quoting the Submission Agreement submitted by the respondent).
191 See id.; AAA/ABA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 7, Canon II; INT'L BAR ASS'N,
GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INT'L ARBITRATION 9-11 (2004), available
at http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/guidelines%20text.pdf.
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vacated due to the neutral arbitrator's nondisclosure. While the
award would have likely been vacated under the Supreme
Court's standard of "evident partiality," 192 this holding suggests
not only a continuing obligation to disclose facts which might
create a reasonable impression of bias, but also a continuing
obligation to investigate any relationship that is disclosed for
potential developments. The court noted:
It is reasonable, considering the Submission Agreement and
[the arbitrator's] own disclosure statement, that the parties
would rely on [the arbitrator] to continue to provide them with
information should there be a relevant change in his
relationship or in the event he discovered that he had misstated
193
the facts in his disclosure.
B.

California'sNew Ethics Standard

In response to consumer frustration over mandatory
arbitration agreements, the California legislature took action in
2001 to curb what was perceived as arbitrator and arbitrationprovider abuses. 194 It enacted section 1286.2(a)(6)(A) of the
California Code of Civil Procedure as a solution to the growing
95
"lack of public confidence" in arbitration in consumer contexts.
The statute codified the new California Ethics Standards
requiring additional and extremely comprehensive arbitrator
"disclosures about the relationships between the provider
organization and a party or lawyer involved in a consumer
arbitration,"'' 96 including disclosures about past service as a
dispute resolution neutral for any party or attorney, other
interests, relationships and affiliations that may constitute
conflicts of interest, as well as "establishment of future
197
professional relationships."'
192 See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151-52
(1968) (White, J., concurring) ("[W]here the arbitrator has a substantial interest in a
firm which has done more than trivial business with a party, that fact must be
disclosed.").
193 Applied Industrial,at *19.
194 See Ruth V. Glick, CaliforniaArbitration Reform: The Aftermath, 38 U.S.F.
L. REV. 119, 120-22 (2003).
195 See Jaimie Kent, The Debate in California Over and Implications of New
Ethical Standards for ArbitratorDisclosure:Are the Changes Valid or Appropriate?,

17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 903, 911-12 (2004).

Glick, supra note 194, at 122 (citing CAL. ETHICS STDS., supra note 7, No. 8).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.85 (West 2002) (codifying the requirements of
S.B. No. 475, 2001 Leg. (Ca. 2002)).
196
197
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If an arbitrator wishes to entertain offers from other
professional relationships, such as that of a mediator or other
dispute resolution neutral, the arbitrator must disclose to all
parties in writing within ten days of nomination that he or she
will entertain such offers of employment. A party may then
disqualify the arbitrator based on this disclosure.
If no
disclosure is made, the arbitrator is prohibited from entering into
any new dispute resolution relationships with the parties or
98
attorneys while the arbitration is pending.
The duty of an arbitrator to make reasonable inquiry into
her potential conflicts was expanded as well. 199 Section 9 lays
out an obligation for an arbitrator to "inform himself or herself of
relationships or other matters involving her or her extended
family and former spouse" by inquiring with immediate and
extended family members and indicating in writing that he or
she did such an inquiry. 20 0 Further, an arbitrator must "inform
himself or herself of relationships with any lawyer associated in
20 1
the practice of law with the lawyer in the arbitration."
The new statutes provide for disclosure of "specific data
about arbitrations they have administered within the past
five years" and "post the data on an internet website in a
computer-searchable format." 20 2 Broader than disclosure rules
20 3
promulgated by the NASD and the New York Stock Exchange,
the California rules extend to all neutral arbitrators throughout
20 4
the period of the arbitration.
Most dramatically, the California statute provides for
vacating decision when arbitrators don't properly disclose
transforming once optional guidelines into a mandate "with
consequences for failure to comply."20 5 If an arbitrator fails to
comply with the statutory Ethics Standards, a party may serve a

198 See CAL. ETHICS STDS., supra note 7,

No. 12(c).

199 See Glick, supra note 194, at 123.
200 CAL. ETHICS STDS., supra note 7, No. 9(b).
201
202
203

Id. No. 9(c).

Glick, supra note 194, at 122.
See NASD MANUAL, supra note 8, R. 10312(a); N.Y. STOCK EXCH.,
ARBITRATION RULES, R. 610(a) (2003) ("Each arbitrator shall be required to disclose
to the Director of Arbitration any circumstances which might preclude such
arbitrator from rendering an objective and impartial determination.").
204 See CAL. ETHICS STDS., supranote 7, No. 3(a).
205 Glick, supra note 194, at 121-22 (citing Jay Folberg, Arbitration Ethics-Is
California the Future?,18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 343, 346 (2003)).
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notice of disqualification. 206 Some of the specific mandatory
disclosure requirements include: family relationships with a
party or a lawyer in the arbitration, 207 a relationship between a
family members and an arbitrator, any service within the last
five years in a case involving a party or attorney in the current
arbitration, financial interests of the arbitrator or a family
member in a party, or anything that "otherwise leads the
arbitrator to believe that his or her disqualification will further
''208
the interests of justice.
Since state legislation cannot treat arbitration agreement in
contracts differently than it treats provisions in contracts as a
whole, 20 9 California sought to avoid preemption under the
Federal Arbitration Act by shifting the focus away from
arbitration contracts and onto the arbitrators themselves. 210 But,
will codes such as California's Ethic Standards pass preemption?
In Ovitz v. Schulman, the California Court of Appeal held that
the FAA does not preempt the new standards based on the
court's "review of the relevant statutory language, the
congressional purpose of the FAA, and the parties' arbitration
agreement." 211 After submitting to mandatory arbitration, an
award was rendered in favor of Ovitz. However, during the
arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator, Campbell Lucas, disclosed
that he had accepted an offer a few months ago for a future
matter with Ovitz's counsel's firm. When the opposing party
sought disqualification of Lucas, the AAA refused. In opposition
to Ovitz's motion to confirm the award, Shulman argued that
Lucas' failure to disclose his business relationship at the time of
appointment warranted vacatur under California Ethics
Standard 12(b).
Ovitz argued that the FAA preempted the California Ethics
Standards, such that an award vacatur is limited to the statutory
language of the Act, specifically evident partiality. An example
of how California is attempting to avoid preemption by placing
See CAL. ETHICS STDS., supra note 7, No. 10(a).
207 See id. No. 7(d). This includes "[t]he spouse or domestic partner of a lawyer
206

in the arbitration." Id.
208 Id.
209 Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).

210 Drahozal, supra note 169, at 393-95 (citing many states' moves toward
adopting the RUAA, focusing on the process of arbitration-which includes extensive
disclosure requirements-instead of trying to mandate arbitration).
211 Ovitz v. Schulman, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 131 (Ct. App. 2005).
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emphasis on an arbitrators duties, the court distinguished
between the FAA's "evident partiality" as a basis for vacatur and
the California Ethics Standards requirements for arbitrator
disclosure. The court found that the arbitrator did not comply
with section 12(b) by failing to note a relevant relationship in his
initial disclosure and then failing to disclose after accepting a
position in another case, "knowing of the involvement of the law
212
firm representing [one of the parties] in the... arbitration."
The issue, therefore, was explicitly about disclosure, not about
vacatur. And since the FAA does not contain a provision
regarding disclosure (i.e., Congress has not spoken on the issue),
there is no conflict of law and, therefore, not a preemption issue.
In response to the new rules, however, provider
organizations such as the NASD protested that California could
not provide for more stringent standards than those of the
Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC"). 2 13 In response, the
NASD and the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") "asked the
federal court to exempt them from [the Standards, claiming]
there was already extensive federal oversight" and that the FAA
preempted the standards. 2 14 The court denied the NASD and
NYSE relief. Two years later, however, the district court in Mayo
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 215 held that:
[A]pplication of the California standards to the NYSE and other
self-regulatory organizations is preempted by the Exchange Act
and the comprehensive system of federal regulations of the
securities industry established pursuant to the Exchange Act.
Moreover, at least as they are applied here, the California
2 16
standards are preempted by § 2 of the FAA.
In 2005, the Ninth Circuit, in Credit Suisse First Boston
Corp. v. Grunwald,2 17 held that the California Ethics Standards
were preempted by the NASD and NYSE disclosure rules. Also
citing congressional intent and jurisdiction, the court affirmed
Id. at 128.
See Glick, supra note 194, at 190; Kent, supra note 195, at 903.
Glick, supra note 194, at 190 (citing Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Nat'l
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers Dispute Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council of Cal., 232
F. Supp. 2d 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (No. C-02-3486-SC)).
215 258 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2003), amended, 260 F. Supp. 2d 979 (N.D.
Cal. 2003).
216 Id. at 1116; see also Jevne v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 542, 553-54 (Ct.
App. 2003) (holding that NASD rules preempt the California Standards as a result
of a direct conflict regarding arbitrator disqualification provisions).
217 400 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005).
212

213
214
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that the NASD is not bound by California's ethics rules because
they were preempted by a provision in the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act. 21 8 Preemption applied because Congress' goal was
inhibited by California's ethics rules where it made the SEC
responsible for regulating self-regulating organizations; since it
would be impossible to comply with both the federal rules and
the California rules, the Supremacy Clause mandates that the
NASD rules govern. 219 The NASD's Code does not mandate, but
rather allows for removal of an arbitrator if she fails to make a
required disclosure; even though an arbitration can be
disqualified, parties may opt to prevent such disqualification by
"unanimously agreeing that the arbitrator should not be
disqualified."220 And, the battle seems hardly over as the court
failed to address whether the FAA also preempted the California
rules.
Those in favor of the new standards hold it as more efficient
because it places the burden on those affected by the violation, as
opposed to a government agency. It also provides for increased
transparency with consequences to follow for failures to disclose,
which give consumers some semblance of legitimacy and provide
incentives for disclosure prior to arbitration. 2 21
Those in
opposition to the new disclosure revisions see formal ethical
regulations as another way that parties will avoid liability by
using the standards to overturn otherwise legitimate arbitration
awards.

222

For now, California's Ethics Standard is the most demanding
in the nation, and whether or not the FAA preempts the
standards has yet to be addressed. Caution is essential, as one
commentator noted:
The California disclosure rules for neutral arbitrators are
complex and unforgiving. Knowing the rules and complying
with them to the letter are essential not only for arbitrators,
obviously, but also for the parties and their counsel. The latter
must be aware of what the arbitrator has disclosed and, based
on those disclosures, whether or not they or their opponents
218
219

Id. at 1136.
Id.

220 Id. at 1134 n.20.
221 Kent, supra note 195, at 922.
222 Id. at 923; see also Glick, supra note 194, at 128 (noting that any nondisclosure "no matter how trivial, has the potential to become the basis for
challenging the enforcement of the award").
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may offer the arbitrator additional employment as a neutral
while the arbitration is pending. The consequences of failing to
keep track can be significant. In the Ovitz case, even if the
parties were to go through a second arbitration, the $1.9 million
award of attorneys' fees and costs in the first arbitration still
223
would be lost forever.

C.

Other States'DisclosureRequirements

1.

Revised Uniform Arbitration Act and State Treatment of
Evident Partiality

Officially approved in 2000, the Revised Uniform Arbitration
Act ("RUAA") 224 was promulgated to provide, where parties'
agreements are silent, "a model for arbitration that was
increasingly efficient, streamlined,

and ...

more attractive.

'22 5

The Committee wanted to limit "the grounds on which a court
may review an arbitrator's award." 226 Notwithstanding concerns
of efficiency, the committee understood that the "notion of
decision making by independent neutrals is central to the
arbitration process." As of early 2006, the following states have
adopted some version of the RUAA 227 : Alaska, 228 Colorado, 229
Delaware, 230 Hawaii, 231 Nevada, 23 2 New Jersey, 233 New Mexico, 234
North Carolina, 2 35 North Dakota, 236 Oklahoma, 237 Oregon, 238
Tennessee, 239 Utah,240 and Washington. 24 1 And currently, at
223 Walter Johnson, Ovitz v. Shulman: California'sDisclosure Rules for Neutral
Arbitrators Are Not Preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, REGULATED FIN.
INSTITUTIONS ALERT (Nixon Peabody LLP, New York, N.Y.), Nov. 8, 2005, at 4.

Nixon Peabody LLP is the firm that represented Schulman on appeal.
224

UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (2000).

225 Matthew E. Braun, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 237, 238 (2002).
226 Id.

227 UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (2000).
228 ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.43.300 to .595 (2006).
229 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-212 (West 2006).
230 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5701 (2006).
231 HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 658A-23 (LexisNexis 2006).
232 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38.227 (LexisNexis 2006).
233 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:23B-1 to 23B-32 (West 2006).
234 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7A-13 (West 2006).
235 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-569.12 (2006).
236 N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.3-12 (2006).
237 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1863 (West 2006).
238 OR. REV. STAT. § 36.650 (2006).
239 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-301 (2006).
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least twelve states and the District of Columbia have adopted or
242
introduced such legislation.
Similar to the AAAIABA Code of Ethics, the RUAA provides
that before accepting an appointment, an arbitrator must disclose
known facts that could affect his or her impartiality, such as
financial or personal interests in the outcome. Lack of this
required disclosure may be a ground for vacating an arbitration
award.
The Drafting Committee was unequivocal about
providing an objective standard for disclosure requiring those
"facts that a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the
arbitrator's impartiality in the arbitration proceeding" to be
disclosed. 2 43 Again, this is similar to the AAA/ABA revised
Ethics Codes, 244 as is the ongoing nature of an arbitrator's
245
disclosure obligations.
In adopting the Fourth Circuit's holding in ANR Coal Co.,
Inc. v. Cogentrix of North Carolina,Inc. 246 that only substantial
relationships provide the basis for evident partiality, the
Committee altered the requirement to disclose broadly "any"
interest, replacing it with the need to disclose "'an' existing or
past" interest with the purpose of having arbitrators "not to
247
include de minimis interests or relationships."

UTAH CODEANN. § 78-31a-101 (2006).
WASH. REV. CODE § 7.04A.120 (2007).
242 See The Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, A Few Facts
About the Uniform Arbitration Act (2000), http://www.nccusl.org?Update/
uniformactfactsheets?uniformacts-fs-aa.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).
243 UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12 cmt. 3, 7 U.L.A. 45 (2000) (citing ANR Coal Co.,
Inc. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 1999)).
244 See id. § 12 cmt. 2.
245 Id. § 12(b).
246 173 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 1999).
247 Id. § 12, cmt. 2.
For example, if an arbitrator owned a mutual fund which as part of a large
portfolio of investments held some shares of stock in a corporation involved
as a party in an arbitration, it might not be reasonable to expect the
arbitrator to know of such investment and in any event the investment
might be of such an insubstantial nature so as not to reasonably affect the
impartiality of the arbitrator.
Id.; see also Beebe Med. Ctr., Inc. v. InSight Health Servs. Corp., 571 A.2d 426, 427
(Del. Ch. 1999) (holding that under the Delaware Uniform Arbitration Act, title 10,
section 5714(a)(2), nondisclosure that the attorney representing InSight was also
representing the AAA arbitrator in a matter worth over $100,000 constituted facts of
a substantial relationship to create "reasonable impression of bias" sufficient to
vacate an award).
240
241
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The RUAA's vacatur section limits the grounds on which a
party could seek vacatur in an attempt to curb vacatur as a
248
means of expressing dissatisfaction with an arbitration result.
Addressing the tension that riddles the issue of disclosure in
arbitration, the RUAA addresses the conflict between the desire
for arbitrator independence and impartiality with the industryspecific nature of arbitration, which demands an experience that
comes with "ties in the business world." 249 To this extent, and in
contrast to the AAAIABA provision, there is no presumption of
neutrality for arbitrators generally, only for neutral arbitrators.
Under section 12(e) of the RUAA, a neutral arbitrator who fails
to disclose "known, direct, and material interest in the outcome of
the arbitration proceeding or a known, existing, and substantial
relationship with a party is presumed to act with evident
partiality under Section 23(a)(2)." 250 There is no per se vacatur
for nondisclosure.
Distinctive to the RUAA, where an arbitrator fails to disclose
information set forth in the statute, she or he "creates the
presumption of vacatur in Section 23(a)(2)." The burden then
shifts to the party accused of nondisclosure "to rebut the
presumption by showing that the award was not tainted by the
non-disclosure or there in fact was no prejudice." 25 1 The statute
provides that where the arbitrator fails to rebut the presumption,
the award shall be vacated. Grounds for vacatur may be found in
relationships outside those enumerated, so long as there is "a
known, direct and material interest" or a "substantial
25 2
relationship."
The states that have adopted some form of the RUAA have
consistently retained the objective standard for determining
evident partiality, with at least Hawaii and Utah adopting the
code verbatim. 253 With exceptions, there have been few cases
248 See Stephen L. Hayford, Federal Preemption and Vacatur: The Bookend
Issues Under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 67, 81
(discussing how vacatur sections of arbitration statutes act as vehicles of closure for
arbitration agreements).
249 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148 (1968);
see also UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12(c)-(e) (2000).
250 UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12(e).
251 Id. § 12 cmt. 4.
252 Id. § 12 cmt. 4.
253 See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 435.450 (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-569.12 (2006);
N.D. CENT. CODE, § 32-29.3-12 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23B-12(a) (West 2006)
(providing that prior to accepting an arbitration appointment, an arbitrator shall
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under these new statutes (especially as some have gone into
effect as recently as this year) addressing the vacatur of
arbitration awards due to the failure of an arbitrator to
disclosure facts potentially rendering him or her partial.
Where state courts have addressed arbitrator disclosure
under their respective RUAA, the results have not differed
greatly from federal courts adopting the reasonable standard,
with some relying explicitly on federal case law to determine
whether an arbitrator's failure to disclose requires vacatur under
section 10(a)(2). As indicated above, the inquiries into evident
partiality are fact-intensive and require courts to look at the
nature of the relationships or conflicts at issue, in particular
whether there exists a financial or other interest that is
contemporaneous with the arbitration or where there is a
25 4
relationship that is not trivial.
Despite the intent behind the RUAA, 25 5 the Act has not
greatly clarified arbitrator disclosure.
In its first case to
interpret the revised Nevada Arbitration Act, the Supreme Court
of Nevada reversed the district court's vacatur of an arbitration
256
award as the facts failed to established evident partiality.
Adopting a "reasonable impression of partiality" standard, the
court held that the arbitrator Matthew Goldberg did not have a
duty to disclose his membership on a permanent arbitration
panel for the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, despite
disclose "known facts that a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the
impartiality of the arbitrator"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7A-13 (West 2006); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12, § 1863 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.650 (2006); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 78-31a-113, 78-31a-124 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.04A.120 (2007); H.B 1210,
81st Legis. Assemb. (S.D. 2006).
254 See Del Piano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 859 A.2d 742,
743-45, 747-48 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (holding, in an arbitration pursuant
to the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, that an arbitrator's failure to disclose
that the company he worked for had been a former co-underwriter with Merrill
Lynch following an investigation did not satisfy the standard of evident partiality,
particularly because such a relationship has no connection to the arbitration).
255 See Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism:A State
Role in CommercialArbitration,54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 220 (2002).
Seizing the opportunity to sharpen and clarify, the RUAA Drafting
Committee laid out a statutory standard for arbitrator disclosure that
places an affirmative, continuing duty on arbitrators to make a reasonable
inquiry and to disclose to the parties "any known facts that a reasonable
person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator in
the arbitration proceeding.
Id. (quoting the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 12(a)-(b) (2000)).
256 Thomas v. City of N. Las Vegas, 127 P.3d 1057, 1070 (Nev. 2006).
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the fact that the plaintiffs brought this case in protest of their
termination from the North Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department. 2 7
Such a membership was not one of the
relationships outlined in the revised code comments and did not
rise to the level of a "managerial, representational or
consultative" level; further, Goldberg had no financial interest at
258
stake in the arbitration.
In Bailey v. American General Life and Accident Insurance
Co., 259 the court refused to vacate an award on a challenge that a
The
neutral AAA arbitrator failed to sufficiently disclose.
arbitrator, Barbara Moss, provided a disclosure statement, sent
it to the parties via the AAA, which indicated that her firm was
representing respondent American General in two other matters
and a colleague represented American General "from time to
time." The AAA indicated that any objections to any disclosure
were to be made "on or before January 16, 2002," after which the
260
AAA would make a determination on such objections.
Petitioner Bailey did not challenge the disclosure until after the
award at which time she claimed that the disclosure should have
provided more details. The court found that Bailey had waived
any objection to the disclosure because the Rules laid out in the
parties' Resolution Plan required that disclosure be made "for
comment."261 Relying on Second Circuit case law, allowing Bailey
to challenge the award after an unfavorable award would
condone parties making "strategic decisions not to challenge the
selection of an arbitrator [but] only to use the same grounds to
262
challenge the award later."
Colorado has adopted its version of the UAA (known as the
CUAA). Despite rigid guidelines which mirror the FAA, there
have been no reported Colorado cases of vacatur based solely on a
failure to disclose since the revision. 263 Under its code, there
must be a showing of "evident partiality," which has generally

257
258

See id. at 1061-63.
See id. at 1070.

259 No. M2003-01666, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 838, at

*1-2 (Ct. App. Dec. 29,

2005).
Id. at *11.
Id. at *24-25.
Id. at *30.
0. Russel Murray, Arbitrator and Mediator Disclosure Obligations in
Colorado,COLO. LAw., Sept. 2005, at 53.
260
261
262
263
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been defined as financial interest;264 this is consistent with
Justice White's concurrence in Commonwealth Coatings.
D.

NationalAssociation of SecuritiesDealers2

65

The NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure 266 requires that
arbitrators "disclose:
(1) any direct or indirect financial or
personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration; (2) any
existing or past financial, business, professional, family, social, or
other relationships or circumstances that are likely to affect
impartiality or might reasonably create an appearance of
partiality or bias."267 A distinction from other codes in the NASD
Code is that "[aill arbitrators in securities controversies must
qualify as impartial, neutral arbitrators." 268 The Code also
requires arbitrators to investigate potential conflicts before and
during arbitration. NASD Director also retains authority to
2 69
disqualify an arbitrator.
264
265

See id.
The NASD was created pursuant to Section 15A of the Securities Exchange

Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2000). See Robert N. Rapp, Rethinking Risky
Investments for That Little Old Lady: A Realistic Role for Modern Portfolio Theory in
Assessing Suitability Obligations of Stockbrokers, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 189, 197
n.32 (1998).
266 See NASD MANUAL, supra note 8, R. 10312.
267 Id. R. 10312(a).
268 NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL (2007), http:lwww.
nasd.com/ArbitrationMediation/ResourcesforArbitratorsandMediators/GeneralInfor
mationandReference/ArbitratorsManual/DutytoDiscloseConflicts/index.htm.
269 See NASD MANUAL, supra note 8, R. 10312. Rule 10312 states the following:
(d) Removal by Director
(1) The Director may remove an arbitrator based on information that is
required to be disclosed pursuant to this Rule.
(2) After the commencement of the earlier of (A) the first pre-hearing
conference or (B) the first hearing, the Director may remove an
arbitrator based only on information not known to the parties when
the arbitrator was selected. The Director's authority under this
subparagraph (2) may be exercised only by the Director or the
President of NASD Dispute Resolution.
(3) The Director will grant a party's request to disqualify an arbitrator
if it is reasonable to infer, based on information known at the time of
the request, that the arbitrator is biased, lacks impartiality, or has an
interest in the outcome of the arbitration. The interest or bias must be
direct, definite, and capable of reasonable demonstration, rather than
remote or speculative.
(e) The Director shall inform the parties to an arbitration proceeding of any
information disclosed to the Director under this Rule unless either the
arbitrator who disclosed the information withdraws voluntarily as soon as
the arbitrator learns of any interest, relationship, or circumstances

246
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In 2004, the SEC approved revisions to the NASD Code,
270
specifically provisions that dealt with arbitrator disclosure.
Similar to the AAAIABA Code of Ethics and the California Ethics
Standards, these revisions were prompted by a perceived lack of
confidence in the arbitration process, specifically on the part of
investors. To determine the impact of the recently adopted
California Ethic Standards on the current conflict disclosure
rules of SRO's, the SEC initiated and published the Report to the
Securities And Exchange Commission Regarding Arbitrator
Conflict Disclosure Requirements in NASD and NYSE Securities
Arbitrations 271 ("Perino Report"). The Perino Report provided for
the adoption of several new provisions regarding arbitrator
disclosure.
Nevertheless, the evaluation concluded that the
changes implemented in the California Ethics Standard were
more costly than effective, particularly as "there is little if any
indication that undisclosed conflicts represent a significant
problem" in NASD or NYSE (collectively, self-regulating
organizations, or SRO's) arbitrations. 272 According to the report,
"significant unintended consequences ... may reduce investors'
perceptions of the fairness of SRO arbitrations."

described in paragraph (a) that might preclude the arbitrator from
rendering an objective and impartial determination in the proceeding, or
the Director removes the arbitrator.
Id.
270 Cf. Constantine N. Katsoris, Roadmap to Securities ADR, 11 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 413, 423 (2006).

With the significant influx of additional and often more complex cases
resulting from the McMahon decision, numerous issues that previously had
only been discussed at SICA (when SRO arbitrations were largely
voluntary) were reconsidered (for example: expanded discovery procedures;
selection, qualification, background disclosures, training and evaluation of
arbitrators; method of transcribing and preserving the record of arbitration
hearings; and, the burdens placed upon SROs resulting from the
anticipated increase in case loads.
Id.
271 The SEC retained Professor Michael Perino to assess the California
Standards, the results of which were made available in MICHAEL PERINO, REPORT

TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION REGARDING ARBITRATOR CONFLICT
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN NASD AND NYSE SECURITIES ARBITRATIONS 2-3
(Nov. 4, 2002), http://www.http://www.sec.gov/pdf/arbconflict.pdf.
272

Id. at 3; see also Kent, supra note 195, at 903 n.5 (citing Caroline E. Mayer,

Arbitration Standards Challenged, WASH. POST, July 30, 2002, at E01 ("The
California rules are so complex that they not only would raise the cost of arbitration
but also could reduce the number of arbitrators willing to serve.")).
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To address complaints that arbitrators themselves display a
bias towards the securities industry, 273 even where contrary to
Perino's report indicating little investor lack of confidence, 274 the
report did recommend additions that have since been codified.
These included:
an amendment reinforcing disclosure as
mandatory; 275 redefinition of what a public and non-public
arbitrator is; and an amended definition of family. 276 The Code
now expands the definition of "immediate family member ...

to

include parents, stepparents, children, or stepchildren, as well as
any member of the arbitrator's household. 277 As the Code
mandates that an investor with a dispute shall be entitled to
arbitration with a public arbitrator, the modification in who a
public arbitrator is has import for Rule 10308(a)(4) increases the
years for an arbitrator to transition from the industry to working
as a public arbitrator from three to five. Under the definition of
who a public arbitrator is, Rule 10308(a)(5)(A)(ii) bans anyone
273 PERINO, supra note 271, at 3; see generally Peter B. Rutledge, Market
Solutions to Market Problems: Re-Examining Arbitral Immunity as a Solution to
Unfairness in Securities Arbitration,26 PACE L. REV. 113, 114-15 (2005) (discussing
the general perception of unfairness regarding securities arbitrations).
274 See NATIONAL ARBITRATION
FORUM
REPORT:
STUDIES
COMPARE
ARBITRATION
AND
LITIGATION,
http://www.arbitration-truth.com/arbitrationstudies.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
The data were derived from securities arbitrations involving consumers
over a 21-year period (1980-2001). During those years securities industry
arbitrators decided 31,001 public customer cases, and 16,294 of those cases
(52.56%) resulted in awards for consumers. (Note: Federal court data from
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts show plaintiffs in
"Stockholders Suits" in 2000 prevailed only 32% of the time).
Furthermore, in a study surveying the responses of NASD investorparticipants regarding their perceptions of fairness of SRO arbitrations, the
results showed that an overwhelming 93% of the respondents believed their
cases were handled fairly and without bias. Also, over 91% of respondents
said their arbitrators demonstrated a level of fairness that was classified as
excellent or good.
Id.
275 NASD MANUAL, supra note 8, R. 10312(b). The language of this provision
was changed to read that "arbitrators must make a reasonable effort to inform
themselves of any interests, relationships or circumstances described" above from
"arbitrators should' make such disclosures.
276 U.S. Securities Exchange Commission, Report to the SEC Regarding
Arbitrator Conflict Disclosure Requirements in NASD and NYSE Securities
Arbitrations,http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-161.htm.
277 Order Granting Approval to a Proposed Rule Change Relating to Arbitrator
Classification and Disclosure in NASD Arbitrations, 69 Fed. Reg. 21,871, 21,873
(Apr. 24, 2004).
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who has been in the industry for at least twenty years from
becoming a public arbitrator, among the other restrictions on
278
who can be a public arbitrator.
In Schmitz, discussed previously, as per an agreement
between the parties, any dispute was to be arbitrated in
accordance with the NASD Code. 2 79 After a dispute arose
between the parties, arbitrators were chosen and disclosure
forms were completed in compliance with the NASD ethical code;
neither side objected to the chosen arbitrators. After the panel
found in favor of the appellees, the appellants learned that one of
the arbitrators' law firm had represented the parent company,
Prudential Insurance, Inc., of the appellee "in at least nineteen
cases during a period of 35 years," with the most recent being
twenty-one months prior to the arbitration at issue. 280 The
arbitrator, John R. Conrad, while he knew Prudential Insurance,
Inc. was the parent company, only ran a check for the appellees'
company, Prudential-Bache. Thus, Conrad did not uncover the
cases at issue and did not disclose them.
The appellants
appealed the award in favor of the appellees, claiming that this
failure to investigate and disclose constituted evident partiality
281
under the FAA.
The court looked to the NASD Code in determining that
neutral arbitrators have an independent duty to investigate
potential conflicts. In overturning the district court's ruling that
there was no evident partiality, the court adopted the
"reasonable impression of partiality" standard for proving
evident partiality in nondisclosure cases. 28 2 The court rejected
the district court's contention that there could be no evident
partiality where the arbitrator had no duty to investigate and,
therefore, no knowledge of the conflict. 28 3 The Ninth Circuit
rejects this, stating, that while such knowledge precludes actual
bias, "it does not always prohibit a reasonable impression of
partiality."28 4 There is an independent duty to investigate, under
Sections 23(a) and (b) of the NASD Code, such that where "an
278
279
280

281

NASD MANUAL, supra note 8, R. 10308(a)(5)(A)(ii).
Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1044 (9th Cir. 1994).
Id.
Id. at 1044-45.

282 Id.
at 1046, 1048-50 (quoting Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d
1197, 1201 (11th Cir. 1982) and adopting its standard).

283
284

Id. at 1048.
Id.
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actual conflict exists and the lawyer has constructive knowledge
28 5
of it," it creates a reasonable impression of partiality.
The court held that the arbitrator had actual knowledge of
the relationship between Prudential-Bache and Prudential
Insurance, and therefore he had constructive knowledge of his
firm's previous representations of the parent company. His
failure to fulfill his duty "under the NASD Code to make a
reasonable effort to inform himself of his firm's representation of
Pru[dentiall -Bache's parent" evidenced evident partiality and
28 6
warranted vacatur.
Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit held that a violation of the
NASD Code as it relates to disclosure standards, does not
28 7
demand vacatur in federal court where the FAA is applicable.
This reinforces the fact, as articulated in Commonwealth
Coatings, that while courts may look to ethics codes for guidance,
they are not the law and thus not binding on arbitrators. 28 8 The
NASD Code requires on-going disclosure of relationships (which
by definition precludes just an appearance before an arbitrator)
with grounds for vacatur of arbitration claims still falling under
section 10(a)(2). 28 9 In quoting University Commons-Urbana v.
Universal Constructors, Inc., the court in Boll v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce,Fenner & Smith, Inc. 290 noted that:
[The Eleventh Circuit was careful to distinguish between "a
large number of [previous encounters between counsel for one of
the parties and an arbitrator]" which "at first blush" might
seem to imply an inappropriately close association between
arbitrator and counsel," but might "simply be the result of the
fact that both specialize in [a certain area of the law]" and those
285

286

Id.
Id. at 1049.

287 Montez v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 260 F.3d 980, 984 (8th Cir. 2001).
288 Id. ("[A] federal court cannot vacate an arbitration award based on a failure
to disclose merely because an arbitrator failed to comply with NASD rules.").
289 See id. (holding that arbitrator partiality is not established by an arbitrator's
undisclosed past associations with the law firm representing one of the parties,
dating back five years); Mariner Fin. Group v. Bossley, 79 S.W.3d 30, 30-32, 35 (Tex.
2002) (holding that the arbitrator's failure to disclose that the customer's expert
witness had previously testified against him presented factual issues as to his
partiality); Katsorsis, supra note 270, at 440 ("After McMahon, the [disclosure]
section was expanded to parallel Canon II of the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in
Commercial Disputes (Code of Ethics) by explicitly imposing a duty upon the
arbitrator to disclose any potential conflict-an ongoing duty which continues
throughout the proceeding.").
290 No. 04-800031, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 27948 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2004).

ST. JOHNS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:203

cases where the previous encounters "represent part of an
ongoing business relationship." While disclosure would be
required in the first291instance, no such disclosure would be
required in the latter.
Distinguishing the contact outlined in University CommonsUrbana, where a non-party had an undisclosed, substantial
financial relationship with an arbitrator, the court rebuked any
hint at evident partiality where the respondent had no financial
or business relationship with either arbitrator at any time before
or during the arbitration. 292 The court hinged the Boll decision
on the lack of any relationship, which is what the court
distinguished from "trivial business relationships" under
293
Commonwealth Coatings.
But, even those relationships that seem trivial, and would
most likely not constitute evident partiality, are to be disclosed.
For instance:
[A] securities professional who attends a Rotary Club luncheon
for the purpose of soliciting clients should disclose if he or she
then happens to meet one of the parties, parties'
representatives, or even another arbitrator on the panel.
Although the contact may seem innocuous, the parties have the
right to be apprised of the meeting and to judge the partiality of
294
the arbitrator.
In Van Pelt v. UBS Financial Services,295 the court affirmed
296
an arbitration award against a challenge of evident partiality.
After receiving disclosure statements by James Edward Banks,
one of three NASD-appointed arbitrators, which stated the date
his employment at Bank of America ended, defendant-UBS did
not request additional information nor object in any respect to
his appointment. 297 After the arbitration, UBS "did not lodge any
protest or request any additional information regarding Mr.

291 Id.
at *19 (quoting Univ. Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Constructors
Inc., 304 F.3d 1331, 1339-40 (11th Cir. 2002)).
292 Id. at *21.
293 Id. at *23 n.8.
294 Rina Spiewak, When in Doubt, Disclose, NEUTRAL CORNER, Apr. 2006,
http://www.nasd.com/ArbitrationMediation/ResourcesforArbitratorsandMediators/G
eneralInformationandReferenceTheNeutralCorner/NASDW_016590.
295 No. 3:04cv477, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39556, at *12 (W.D.N.C. June 14,
2006).
296 Id. at *12.
297 Id. at *3.
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Banks." 298 After an award in Van Pelt's favor, however, UBS
challenged the award claiming that Banks evidenced evident
partiality in failing to disclose the circumstances of his
retirement from Bank of America; UBS claimed because his
retirement was recent, whether he was terminated involuntarily
or not could affect his impartiality since the present case was a
termination claim. 29 9 The court disagreed, holding that while the
NASD Rules impose an affirmative duty on arbitrators to
disclose potential conflicts, the "asserted need to investigate
further to see whether the Chairman may have failed to disclose
some material circumstance ...that would create an appearance
of bias is remote, circular, and speculative." 300 Nevertheless,
courts have reiterated that "a federal court cannot vacate an
arbitration award based on a failure to disclose merely because
an arbitrator failed to comply with NASD rules," since section
10(a)(2) controls. 3 1 And, again, courts are left with similar
codes, whether the guiding NASD Code or a codified RUAA,
being used with varying degrees to determine whether an
arbitrator's nondisclosure constitutes evident partiality.
VI. PROPOSED UNIFORM STANDARD

The courts' case-by-case approach to the Supreme Court's
''evident partiality" standard has resulted in inconsistent results
for arbitrator (non)disclosure standards. Various codes adopted
by such organizations as the ABA/AAA and NASD, and statutory
schemes, including the far reaching California statute and the
UAA, have attempted to articulate clear requirements and
standards for violations. Although each attempt contributed
positively to clarifying the requirements, it remains a patchwork
of different standards. Further, with the increased disclosure
requirements and the myriad disclosure standards emanating
from the FAA's "evident partiality" language, the cost and
efficiency of the arbitration process is threatened. For example,
the California statute's requirement that an arbitrator
investigate possible conflicts (past, present, and future) between
the parties and their witnesses and his or her former spouse is
casting the net way beyond the goal of ensuring against actual
298 Id. at *4.
299 Id. at *7-8.
300 Id. at *8-9.
301 Montez v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 260 F.3d 980, 984 (8th Cir. 2001).
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bias. After all, an arbitrator and the former spouse might have
had no contact in the twenty years since the divorce, and
conducting an investigation is simply a waste of time.
The proposed standards for disclosure set out below presume
that most employment and labor arbitrators know most other
arbitrators in the field or had professional and sometimes
30 2
personal relationships with members of the various panels.
Most arbitrators are either attorneys, fully knowledgeable of the
employment law area through their current or previous legal
practices in employment law, or labor arbitrators (most of whom
are attorneys) who usually serve on a variety of labor panels.
Most labor arbitrators know each other from their current or
former legal practices or their previous work as attorneys at the
National Labor Relations Board or state labor relations boards.
A number of both employment and labor arbitrators are law
school professors whose teaching and scholarship involve work
law. 30 3 This experience and expertise of the arbitrators is
essential in employment arbitration because it involves a
complex area of statutory discrimination issues and a large
variety of other statutory and common law claims. This is
especially true with respect to the statutory discrimination
claims, which have evolved primarily through federal court civil
rights litigation establishing and expanding on developing
theories of discrimination law as public law. To privatize
discrimination claims without a requirement that the arbitrators
are experts in the depth of the law would go against the public
policy in the federal discrimination laws to stop or prevent
discrimination that is both harmful to the individual and the
society.
In the traditional labor arbitration area, most of the parties
are "repeat players," since they are all either the unions or

302 The lead author of this article has served on the AAA Employment Dispute
Resolution Panel since its inception in 1996 and attends national meetings of
arbitrators, such as the ABA Section on Labor and Employment, ADR Committee's
meeting. He has regular professional contacts with leading members of the National
Academy of Arbitrators, who traditionally came from a background of labor, in
contrast to employment arbitration, although many of these arbitrators are on
employment panels today.
303 For example, on the New York area AAA Employment Dispute Resolution
Panel, of the approximately twenty-five members, three are current full time law
professors, one a former full time professor, and at least four have served as adjunct
professors.
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employers involved in a collective bargaining relationship.
Employment arbitrators on the AAA's Employment Dispute
Resolution Panels certainly know the other arbitrators in their
geographic areas because they meet at training and other
programs and serve with many members of the Panel on
particular arbitration panels.
Many labor and employment
arbitrators work full time in this capacity. And, of course, since
most arbitrators in the employment and labor arbitration field
have worked primarily in this area during their professional
work lives, they have contacts with numerous attorneys
representing the parties.
Given this reality of frequent contacts between arbitrators
and the attorneys representing the parties, and the important
value of ensuring a process that provides for a fair and impartial
hearing and award, it is crucial that a clear and objective, but not
onerous disclosure requirement, be utilized. Opposing counsel's
appearance in a previous arbitrated matter before one or more
arbitrators on the purported panel or the arbitrators' previous
service with one or more of the arbitrators more than five years
ago is an example of the trivial relationships alluded to by
Justice White in his Commonwealth Coatings concurrence and
304
thus should not rise to the level of evident partiality.
"[F]amiliarity due to confluent areas of expertise does not
indicate bias. Rather, so long as the previous interactions do not
represent part of an ongoing business relationship," such
familiarity with an industry more than likely presents an asset
in the context of arbitration.3 0 5
If any of the arbitrators
previously represented any of the parties, including parent
corporations, that fact should always be disclosed. Where the
arbitrator is no longer working at the firm, however, this fact
should mitigate against disqualification.
In examining the proposed disclosure requirements to
30 6
determine evident partiality, a reasonableness standard
304 See Crow Constr. Co. v. Jeffrey M. Brown Assoc., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 217,
224 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (citing Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393
U.S. 145, 150 (1969) (White, J., concurring)).
305 Univ. Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Constructors Inc., 304 F.3d 1331,
1340-43 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding that the petitioners made out two separate prima
facie cases for vacatur under evident partiality where an arbitrator failed to disclose
a concurrent business relationship with one of the parties' lawyer and a meeting
with the president of the same party).
306 See, e.g., Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Servs.,
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should apply, requiring "more than a mere appearance of bias," 30 7
such that an award will be vacated where the facts would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the arbitrator lacked
partiality. The relationship should be material and substantial
to constitute evident partiality. As indicated in Part III, while an
arbitrator's failure to disclose is relevant to an inquiry into
arbitrator partiality, it alone is not always sufficient to establish
"evident partiality," as set forth in 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2). First, the
arbitrator should make a reasonable inquiry to determine any
disclosable information. Failure to make such an investigation
should result in a vacation where an arbitrator fails to disclose
information that a party subsequently objects to as evidencing
partiality and the objection on its face is material. In other
words, where there is actual bias or an arbitrator fails to disclose
"information which would lead a reasonable person to believe
that a potential conflict exists," 308 then evident partiality is
present. Courts should examine the nature of the relationship
and its connection to the arbitration dispute, including:
(1) personal interest, pecuniary or otherwise, the arbitrator has
in the proceeding; (2) the directness of the relationship between
the arbitrator and the party he is alleged to favor; (3) the
connection of the relationship to the arbitration; and (4) the
proximity in time between the relationship and the arbitration
proceeding.
The time, nature, and depth of the relationship should be
weighed. For example, where a potential conflict involving a
financial or other interest to the arbitrator is contemporaneous or

Inc., 146 F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 1998); Lifecare Int'l, Inc. v CD Med., Inc., 68
F.3d 429, 433 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating that the mere appearance of bias is
insufficient to vacate an arbitration award); Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York City
Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984); Int'l
Produce, Inc. v. A/S Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir. 1981).
307 See, e.g., Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1264 (7th Cir.
1992) ("'Evident partiality'.., means more than a mere appearance of
bias ....
[O]ften [arbitrators] have interests and relationships that overlap with the
matter they are considering as arbitrators. The mere appearance of bias that might
disqualify a judge will not disqualify an arbitrator."); Evans Indus., Inc. v. Lexington
Ins. Co., No. 01-1546, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10419, at *10 (E.D. La. July 12, 2001)
(quoting Bernstein Seawell & Kove v. Bosarge, 813 F.2d 726, 732 (5th Cir. 1987)
(affirming an arbitration award against a challenge of evident partiality where the
arbitrator had at one time owned interest in a partnership at issue, including
earning commissions)).
308 Gianelli Money, 146 F.3d at 1312-13.
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close in time to the arbitration and/or exemplify some significant
relationship, courts should vacate.
An arbitrator should disclose all material and substantial
relationships with any of the arbitrators, the parties, their
representatives, or witnesses that occurred within a five year
period. Any time money changes hands directly between an
arbitrator and another arbitrator, or a representative of one of
the parties involved in a pending arbitration before that
arbitrator, disclosure must take place. In addition, arbitrators
who have served as arbitrators or mediators involving any of the
parties or their representatives outside this period should state,
at least in general terms, that the arbitrator served in such a
capacity in the past, and should give specifics if there are factors
that might demonstrate an actual conflict or bias.
The norm in arbitration should be that there is a strong
presumption of neutrality, unless a parties' intent or applicable
law dictates otherwise, and neutral and non-neutral arbitrators
will be presumed neutral. This places the code of ethics more
parallel to international arbitration standards. If an arbitrator
entertains offers from any party or their representatives, or
forms other professional relationships such as that of a mediator
or other dispute resolution neutral, the arbitrator must timely
disclose to all parties in writing that he or she will entertain such
offers of employment.
CONCLUSION
The courts differ as to what arbitrators should disclose to
prevent disqualification of an arbitrator and/or vacatur of an
award. Even when the courts agree on the standard, it is applied
inconsistently. The recent efforts by various organizations and
states to develop codes of conduct and standards have resulted in
a patchwork of rules. A disclosure standard should require
revelation of actual conflict. In other words, it should preclude
actual bias, but "it does not prohibit a reasonable impression
of partiality."
Arbitrators should disclose fully all their
relationships with parties and potential conflicts of interest prior
to an arbitration proceeding.
The role of the judiciary in
determining an arbitrator's impartiality after an award has been
made will be significantly reduced, since parties will have an
opportunity at the onset of arbitration to reject or accept an
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arbitrator with full knowledge of his connections with the other
party.
[Ilt seems to us that the better practice is that arbitrators
should disclose fully all their relationships with the parties,
whether these ties be of a direct or indirect nature. Although
some unnecessary disclosure may result, "if arbitrators err on
the side of disclosure .... it will not be difficult for courts to

identify those undisclosed relationships which are too
'30 9
insubstantial to warrant vacating an award.
Disclosure must occur at every stage of the arbitration, as
arbitrators have a continuing duty to disclose, 3 10 and sometimes
a continuing duty to investigate, circumstances or relationships
which may provide evidence of evident partiality, whether that
be an impression of bias or facts which would lead a reasonable
person to believe an arbitrator is biased. Where an arbitrator
has completely followed his obligation under rules and terms of
the parties' agreement, which she or he believes might disqualify
him as impartial arbitrator, an arbitration award cannot be set
aside on ground of arbitrator bias.
The codes and the courts should focus on whether the
professional and social relationships between all the actors in the
arbitral forum, the parties, the arbitrators, and the witnesses,
result in evident partiality. A reasonableness standard makes
sense and the codes should be reexamined to ensure that the
value of full disclosure is not overwhelmed by onerous
309 Sanko S.S. Co. v. Cook Indus., Inc., 495 F.2d 1260, 1263-64 (2d Cir. 1973)
(quoting Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 152 (1969)
(White, J., concurring)).
310 AAAJABA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 7, Canon II.C ('CThe obligation to
disclose interests or relationships described in paragraph A is a continuing duty
which requires a person who accepts appointment as an arbitrator to disclose, as
soon as practicable, at any stage of the arbitration, any such interests or
relationships which may arise, or which are recalled or discovered."); NASD
MANUAL, supra note 8, R. 10312(c) ('"The obligation to disclose ...is a continuing
duty that requires a person who accepts appointment as an arbitrator to disclose, at
any stage of the arbitration, any such interests, relationships, or circumstances that
arise, or are recalled or discovered."); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12(b) (2000) ("An
arbitrator has a continuing obligation to disclose to all parties to the agreement to
arbitrate and arbitration proceeding and to any other arbitrators any facts that the
arbitrator learns after accepting appointment which a reasonable person would
consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator."); CAL. ETHICS STDS. supra
note 7, at No. 7(e) ("An arbitrator's duty to inform himself or herself of and to
disclose matters .. . is a continuing duty, applying from service of the notice of the
arbitrator's proposed nomination or appointment until the conclusion of the
arbitration proceeding.").

2007]

DISCLOSURE & DISQUALIFICATION STANDARDS

257

requirements. The fact that employment and labor arbitrators
should be presumed to know each other, and that fact by itself,
should not require disqualification.
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